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Abstract
This political science honors thesis investigates corporate influence on the lawmaking process, with an
emphasis on financial services legislation. The research question is: “As evidenced by the Gramm-Leach Bliley
Act and Dodd-Frank Act, to what extent do corporate interests influence the lawmaking process in absolute
and relative terms vis-à-vis their adversaries (consumer advocates, labor, etc.)?” In assessing the absolute
influence of business groups, this thesis seeks to identify their power in the lawmaking process in relation to
legislators; in identifying their relative power, it compares them to adversary groups. The hypothesis of this
thesis is that corporate powers have significant but not hegemonic influence in the legislative process and that
they were a strong force behind the shape of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and, to a lesser extent, Dodd-Frank.
The first section of this thesis reviews relevant social science literature on the nature and influence of interest
groups in governance. The next section analyzes the primary methods through which interest groups
influence government: campaign finance and lobbying. This section includes information regarding the
growth of such activities over time and the strong advantage business representatives have over unions, public
interest groups, and consumer advocates. The third portion includes the two case studies: the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act and Dodd-Frank financial regulatory reform. These two case studies illustrate the strong power of
business interest groups in the legislative process, while also demonstrating the continuing ability of consumer
advocates to influence key policies.
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Introduction 
What began as a small “Occupy Wall Street” protest in New York in September of 2011  
has expanded into a movement throughout the United States and around the world.  These 
protestors are criticizing (among other things) a society in which big business and the rich have 
disproportionate influence over the middle class and the poor.  At the center of this outcry is the 
belief that government is working for wealthy special interests rather than for the country as a 
whole.  This idea is not new.  In his 1960 classic, The Semi-Sovereign people: A Realist's View of 
Democracy in America, E.E. Schattschneider argued against the pluralistic view that “the people 
really do decide what the government does on something like a day-to-day basis,” contending 
that the political system is biased in favor of the wealthy and big business interests.1   
This political science honors thesis will investigate corporate influence on the lawmaking 
process, with an emphasis on financial services legislation.  The research question to be explored 
is:  “As evidenced by the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act and Dodd-Frank Act, to what extent do 
corporate interests influence the lawmaking process in absolute and relative terms vis-à-vis their 
adversaries (consumer advocates, labor, etc.)?”  In assessing the absolute influence of business 
groups, this thesis will seek to identify their power in the lawmaking process in relation to 
legislators; in identifying their relative power, it will compare them to adversary groups.  The 
hypothesis of this thesis is that corporate powers have significant but not hegemonic influence in 
the legislative process and that they were a strong force behind the shape of Gramm-Leach-
Bliley and, to a lesser extent, Dodd-Frank. 
The answer to this question has implications for the U.S. and global economies as well as 
for the status of James Madison’s vision for American democracy.   The 2007-2008 financial 
                                                 
1
 E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People:  A Realist’s View of Democracy in America, (New York:  Holt, 
Reinhart, and Winston, 1960), 130. 
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crisis can trace many of its causes to specific government policies and de-regulation.  In the 
aftermath of the turmoil of 2008, correcting these underlying problems was an important task for 
government.  An inability to do so because of undue influence in the lawmaking process by 
wealthy groups would illustrate a government that saw certain firms not only as “too big to fail” 
but “too powerful to regulate,” leaving the global economy vulnerable to another economic 
collapse.2  On a more philosophical level, the failure of Congress to fairly weigh competing 
interests would reflect poorly on James Madison’s vision of a legislature that could resist the 
impact of factions and work for the common good of the nation. 
Roadmap for the Thesis 
 The first section of this thesis is a review of relevant social science literature on the 
nature and influence of interest groups in governance.  The next section is an analysis of the 
primary methods through which interest groups influence government:  campaign finance and 
lobbying.  This section includes information regarding the growth of such activities over time 
and the strong advantage business representatives have over unions, public interest groups, and 
consumer advocates.  The third portion includes the two case studies:  the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act and Dodd-Frank financial regulatory reform.  These two case studies illustrate the strong 
power of business interest groups in the legislative process, while also demonstrating the 
continuing ability of consumer advocates to influence key policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The latter of these two terms was created by Professor John DiIulio. 
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Part I:  Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interest Group Theory 
There has been significant attention paid to groups and factions throughout American 
history.  Norm Ornstein and Shirley Elder argue that theories about groups have centered around 
three questions:  Are groups inherently good or bad?  Do groups approximate the public interest 
or undermine it?  Do interest groups represent numerous segments of society or are they 
weighted to the upper class and business?3  Since the founding of the United States, thinking 
about interest groups has morphed into several schools of thought. 
Madison and Interest Groups: 
In the Federalist Papers, particularly numbers 10 and 51, James Madison expresses the 
view that factions are inherently bad and often work against the rights of others and the interests 
of the community.  He defines such groups as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate 
interests of the community.”4  Madison feared the influence of factions in the new republic.  He 
believed that factions result from the flawed nature of humanity:  “If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary…you must first enable the government to control the governed; 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”5  Thus, a major purpose of the Constitution 
                                                 
3
 Norman Ornstein and Shirley Elder, Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking, (Washington:  Congressional 
Quarterly Press, 1978), 7-8. 
4
 James Madison, “Federalist No. 10.” 
5
 James Madison, “Federalist No. 51.” 
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would be to deal with the negative aspects of human nature and the manifestation of those traits 
in factions.   
Madison argues that there are two ways to mitigate the effects of such groups:  to remove 
the cause by constricting liberty or “by controlling its effects.”6  Madison claims that the process 
of destroying liberty to prevent factions is “worse than the disease” and that the Constitution 
should thus seek to mitigate their negative effects.7  He posits that a large and diverse republic 
would control the effects of factions by containing such a large number of such groups that it 
would be difficult for one to gain hegemony.  The system of checks and balances and divided 
powers would further discourage the consolidation of power by one or more groups.  The 
Constitution would limit the power of individual factions and prevent tyranny of the majority.  
Therefore, to Madison, factions are an inevitable and unfortunate outcome of Man’s flawed 
nature; the Constitution should endeavor to control them and limit the effects of humanity’s 
worst impulses, but must not forcibly eradicate liberty in order to do so. 
John C. Calhoun, Interest Groups, and the Existence of the “Public Interest” 
 In the 1840s, South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun rejected James Madison’s notion 
of interest groups in his theory of “the concurrent majority.”  As opposed to Madison, Calhoun 
did not believe that interest groups were inherently selfish; instead, he appreciated them for their 
varying viewpoints.  However, he did agree with the founding father that American society was 
destined to have a diverse set of organizations and viewpoints and that there was a danger of 
“tyranny of the majority.”  Calhoun believed that each of the interest groups in the country 
should have the power to veto any major policy that affected them.  Only in the case in which 
there existed a “concurrent majority” of all interest groups in supporting that policy would it be 
                                                 
6
 Madison, “Federalist No. 10.” 
7
 Ibid. 
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able to be adopted.8  One can clearly see an argument for the preservation of slavery and right of 
states and localities to nullify anti-slavery legislation in Calhoun’s argument.  That being said, he 
did raise an interesting point about the nature of the “public interest.”  While Madison believed 
that there existed a broad public interest, Calhoun rejected this notion, claiming that the so-called 
community interest is nothing other than the independent interests of one or more factions.   
This last point is an important distinction, and one that applies to current discussions of 
special interest groups vs. public interest organizations.  Calhoun’s argument applies to the 
question “whose interest is special?”  In his book Government’s End, Jonathan Rauch argues that 
many community interest organizations, such as environmental groups, peace advocates, and 
consumer groups, are not simply trying to benefit society as a whole, but have self-serving 
agendas.  For example, many of the largest environmental organizations are multimillion-dollar 
corporations.  In 1997, the National Wildlife Federation generated more than $80 million in 
revenue and paid its president more than $300,000.9  Ostensibly, public interest groups are just as 
interested in transferring public resources towards causes they value as business groups.  For 
example, environmentalist groups might care more about preserving forest environments than 
about producing more affordable timber through logging, which is an alternate outcome that may 
be more valued by homebuyers and the rest of society.10  In sum, the arguments John C. Calhoun 
proposed in the 1840s, ostensibly to support slavery, have important and lasting implications for 
the conception of the public interest.   
 
                                                 
8
 John C. Calhoun, “A Disquisition on Government,” in Source Book of American Political Theory, Benjamin F. 
Wright, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1929).   
Also see Ornstein and Elder, 10-11. 
9
 Jonathan Rauch, Government’s End:  Why Washington Stopped Working, (New York: Public Affairs, 1999), 47-
48. 
10
 Ibid., 48-49. 
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The Bentley-Truman Theory of Interest Groups 
 At the turn of the twentieth century, the discipline of political science entered the debate 
over interest groups in American politics.  In 1908, Arthur Bentley published The Process of 
Government, arguing that government and policy reflected that interactions of interest groups 
inside and outside of the government:  “We shall have to get hold of political institutions, 
legislatures, courts, executive officers, and get them stated as groups, and in terms of groups.”11  
This pluralistic view of politics emphasizes that the only thing one needs to do to understand the 
nature of the various groups in society is to observe their stances and actions:  “society, itself, is 
nothing other than the complex of the groups that compose it.”12   
 Bentley’s conception of politics was largely ignored for several decades, but in 1951, 
David B. Truman picked up on this strain of thought in his book The Government Process.  In 
this work, Truman perceives individuals in light of their group identifications.  He cites the 
tendency of people to join multiple groups, each of which has different goals and methods, 
ultimately mitigating the “mischiefs of faction.”13  Together, interest groups form a mosaic “of 
various specialized sorts” that makes up society.14  Truman did not have as negative a view of 
interest groups as James Madison; instead, he saw them as “a necessary and vital component of 
the democratic governmental process.”15  According to political scientist George McKenna, 
Truman and other pluralist scholars “were satisfied with ‘consensus’ and ‘mutual adjustment’” of 
group interests rather than taking Madison’s more deontological drive towards the value of 
“justice” in government.16   
                                                 
11
 Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, (San Antonio:  Principia Press, 1949), 210. 
12
 Ibid, 208-209. 
13
 Ornstein and Elder, 12. 
14
 David B. Truman, The Government Process, (New York:  Alfred Knopf, 1958), 43-44.   
15
 Ornstein and Elder, 12. 
16
 George McKenna, American Politics: Ideals and Realities, (New York:  McGraw Hill, 1976). 
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Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, many other scholars adopted this positive 
disposition towards interest groups.  Lester Milbrath’s 1963 book The Washington Lobbyists 
discounted the influence of interest group lobbyists:  “Lobbyist and lobbying groups have a very 
limited ability to control the selection of officials or to affect the likelihood that an official can 
keep or enhance his position.  They also find it difficult and very expensive to try to manipulate 
public opinion.”17  While Milbrath does consent to the argument that interest groups do have 
considerable power in politics, he claims that this is due to the power of individual members as 
voters, not to the influence of the group.  Another important work in this school of thought was 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee’s 1954 book, Voting, in which the authors argue that the 
political system is served well by individuals participating through the mediating force of interest 
groups.18  In sum, the Bentley-Truman pluralist school of thought had a positive view of interest 
groups in American politics and tended to emphasize the political system as a reflection of the 
interaction of these factions. 
An Upper Class Bias of Interest Groups 
Beginning in the 1930s, E.E. Schattschneider argued that groups achieve disproportionate 
influenced based on their resources and “inside connections,” rather than due to other merits.19  
His 1935 book, entitled Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, contains the observation that groups 
able to buy more experienced and well-connected lobbyists have a leg up in influencing 
Congress.  Notably, such groups achieve success based not on their membership size, but on 
these other monetary factors.20  In his 1960 classic, The Semi-Sovereign People, Schattschneider 
claims that one of the most basic functions of government is to control conflict.  This conflict 
                                                 
17
 Lester Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists, (Chicago:  Rand McNally, 1963), 342. 
18
 Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). 
19
 Ornstein and Elder, 14. 
20
 Ibid. 
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plays out prominently in the “pressure system,” defined as “the organized special-interest 
groups.”21  He distinguishes between public interests (those that are shared by all or by the vast 
majority of members in the community) and special interests (those shared only by a few people 
or by a faction that “exclude others and may be adverse to them”).22  In examining the pressure 
system, Schattschneider comes to the conclusion that government is overwhelmingly influenced 
by the upper class and, especially, by business groups.  He cites lists of national associations in 
the U.S., which reveal a large concentration of business organizations.23  Indeed, Schattschneider 
makes the claim that “the business community is by a wide margin the most highly organized 
segment of society.”24  This organization has profound effects:  businessmen are four to five 
times more likely to be in contact with their representatives than manual laborers.25  He claims 
that even outside the business community, organizations tend to be biased towards the upper 
classes, as wealthy and educated people tend to be more involved in groups.26   
Two other scholars to adopt this view of interest groups were C. Wright Mills and Robert 
Paul Wolff.  In his 1959 book The Power Elite, Mills claims that a small segment of individuals 
in America dominate the economic, political and military spheres of the country.  In reference to 
group influence, he argues that, “high-level lobbying is…done within the confines of that 
elite.”27  In his 1965 essay “Beyond Tolerance,” Robert Paul Wolff criticizes pluralist theories 
for failing to take into account the national interest.  He claims that interest groups naturally pick 
their personalized interests over the public good.  Like Schattschneider, Wolff argues that 
                                                 
21
 Schattschneider,  29. 
22
 Ibid., 23-24. 
23
 Ibid., 31. 
24
 Ibid., 30. 
25
 Ibid.,  31 
26
 Ibid., 33-34. 
27
 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, New York:  Oxford University Press, 1959), 292. 
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government is not merely the sum of interest group relations, but that there is an objective 
national interest superceding these relations.28 
Theodore Lowi and Groups Eroding Public Authority 
Since the 1960s, many scholars have supported the Schattschneider thesis about relative 
interest group power, although some have attributed different root causes to the thesis.  In his 
1969 book The End of Liberalism, Theodore Lowi criticizes interest groups for another reason.29  
He claims that the positive view of interest groups has created a dangerous situation for 
American society, one in which “government had lost its basic sense of legitimacy and 
authority.”30  Lowi posits that, over time, as the government expanded, it abdicated its 
responsibility in determining the direction of public policy to private interests in a process he 
called “interest-group liberalism.”  This had produced an impotent government that lacked clear 
policy goals.31  Lowi criticizes interest-group liberalism for four reasons.  First, it “corrupts 
democratic government” by confusing the fact that people have access to democratic rights with 
the conclusion that they are exercising their rights.  In addition, it “renders government 
impotent” by delegating power to private enterprises, and thus sacrificing governmental power.  
Third, liberal governments demoralize government by failing to achieve justice.  Finally, 
interest-group liberalism corrupts government by replacing clear and formal procedure with 
shadowy informal bargaining.32  Lowi calls his contemporary government the Second Republic, 
with the First Republic having ruled through the first part of the twentieth century.  In this new 
arrangement, interest groups had hijacked the government, forming narrow fiefdoms, in which 
                                                 
28
 Robert Paul Wolff, et al., “Beyond Tolerance,” A Critique of Pure Tolerance, (Boston:  Beacon Press, 1965). 
29
 Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, (New York:  W.W. Norton, 1969). 
30
 Ornstein and Elder, 16. 
31
 Lowi, 287. 
32
 Ibid., 295-298. 
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they possess significant power and resisted any attempts to upset the status quo.33  In the Second 
Republic’s place, Lowi suggests “juridical democracy,” a system in which the government would 
have more authority through defined legislative delegation of authority and more power to make 
rules.34  Interestingly, while Lowi critiqued the pluralist/liberal view of interest groups just as 
Mills and Schattschneider did, he fell on the opposite side of the political spectrum, landing 
closer to conservatives. 
Olson and Collective Action 
In addition to scholars who have focused on the specific actions taken by groups, others 
have emphasized the difficulty of establishing and maintaining groups.  In his 1965 book The 
Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson focuses on the decision-making process behind 
individuals’ decisions about whether to join a particular group.  He argues that large interest 
groups constitute a collective action problem, in that the costs imposed on individuals by 
membership and participation tend to appear greater than any tangible payoff.  Olson claims that 
individuals have a much higher tendency to join groups when such participation is compulsory or 
when the group is small enough that the person sees himself or herself as instrumental to its 
success.35  He argues that it is relatively easy to form small organizations, but much more 
difficult to build medium or large groups.  This theory can easily be applied to interest groups 
and government influence.  People do not have strong incentives to join public interest groups, 
while trade associations only require a small number of firms with strong and specific interests to 
exist and thrive.  Moreover, the perceived benefits of trade associations generally appear larger 
in relation to the cost than a similar comparison with public interest groups. In addition, Olson 
                                                 
33
 Rauch, 224. 
34
 Ornstein and Elder, 16-17. 
35
 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and The Theory of Groups, (Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, 1965).   
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cites the fact that many trade associations provide the additional benefits of research and 
statistics, references on customers, advisory services, etc.36 Thus, pluralism is inaccurate in 
asserting that political outcomes will reflect the interests of competing groups:  “since large 
groups normally will not be able to [act in support of common interests], the outcome of the 
political struggle among the various groups in society will not be symmetrical.”37 
In his book Government’s End, Jonathan Rauch provides a succinct illustration of 
Olson’s theory about private vs. public interests via a fictional organization called C-MOR (The 
Coalition to Make Ourselves Rich).  The group has the choice of fronting all the lobbying money 
for a job-training program that will provide $1 million of benefits to society or a $1 million tax 
break focused on its members.  In the former option, the group will pay the lobbying costs of 
generating the public good, but will receive a small share of the benefits equal to that of the 
people who did not contribute to the lobbying effort.  On the other hand, if the group pursues the 
second option, C-MOR’s members earn a much larger bang for their buck.  Likewise, in 
American society, interest groups have strong incentives to attempt to gain a greater slice of the 
economic pie, rather than try to expand the entire pie.  Additionally, they will tend to fight much 
harder to keep their special benefits and avoid encroachment than will those organizations that 
are acting in the public interest.38  As a result, trade associations tend to be much more equipped 
and financially prepared to influence the government than are large, diffuse public interest 
groups.   
Salisbury and Exchange Theory 
Robert Salisbury focused on the incentive frameworks for groups in “Exchange Theory.”  
In 1969, he published an article in the Midwest Journal of Political Science, entitled “An 
                                                 
36
 Ibid., 145. 
37
 Rauch, 25-26.   
38
 Ibid., 29-30. 
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Exchange Theory of Interest Groups.”39  In this theory, Salisbury focuses within organizations 
on leaders and the various incentive structures available to them.  He identifies three types of 
incentives:  material, solidary (socialization and friendship), and purposive (ideological 
satisfaction).  According to Salisbury, political organizations tend to rely on purposive and 
material incentives.  While groups that rely primarily on purposive incentives do not incur high 
costs, they are naturally unstable, susceptible to splinter organizations and membership 
fluctuations.  Salisbury explains:  “The benefits derived from value expression are seldom of 
great intrinsic worth…a slight change in the member’s resources or social pressures may lead to 
his failure to renew his membership.”40  Organizations that rely on purposive incentives risk 
losing significant membership if the relevant circumstances change.  For example, groups that 
support government reform saw their memberships skyrocket and plummet during Watergate 
and after Nixon resigned, respectively.41  Quite simply, in the absence of a more complicated 
incentive package, organizations relying on purposive rationale are unstable.  In contrast, groups 
that rely on material (money and jobs) benefits tend to have high start-up costs but be relatively 
stable.  Once a trade association is established, its members have a strong motivation for 
remaining in the group:  the association works to improve the financial standing of its members.  
A shift in outside circumstances is less likely to hurt material-driven groups.  Material-oriented 
groups, such as businesses, trade associations, and labor have natural advantages over public 
interest and ideologically motivated organizations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 Robert H. Salisbury, “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, (February, 
1969), 1-32. 
40
 Ornstein and Elder, 19. 
41
 Ibid. 
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Interest Groups in Action 
 Interest groups influence the legislative process through two primary channels:  campaign 
finance and lobbying.  The political science literature paints a picture in which business 
organizations have gained a significant financial and organizational edge over consumer 
advocates and unions. 
How Business Influences Congress:  Campaign Finance 
The Nature of Campaign Finance: 
 One of the most commonly cited ways that corporations influence Congress is through 
the channel of campaign finance.  In his seminal work entitled Congress, David Mayhew cites 
the rise over the course of the 20th century of the “career politician.”  Due to the lack of power of 
political parties in American politics, responsibility for fundraising falls largely on individual 
candidates.42  In order to be elected, representatives need money for polling, paying campaign 
workers, advertising, renting office space, and other purposes.  Monetary resources can often tip 
the balance of a close race.  Former Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, Jr. (D-MA) once stated:  
“There are four parts to any campaign.  The candidate, the issues of the candidate, the campaign 
organization, and the money to run the campaign with.  Without money you can forget the other 
three.”43  Money is important both for managing the campaign and for deterring well-funded 
challengers from running.44  Business-oriented groups often provide much of the cash for an 
election, greatly augmenting contributions from individuals and political parties. 
Over time, the cost of Congressional campaigns has sharply increased:  in 1972, the total 
spending of all House and Senate campaigns was $62.2 million; in the 2010 cycle, this figure 
                                                 
42
 David Mayhew, Congress, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 14-15, 29. 
43
 James W. Lamare, What Rules America? (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1988), 106. 
44
 Mayhew, 41. 
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rose to nearly $1.1 billion.45  According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2010, the 
average winning House campaign spent $1,439,997.46  In order to pay the high price tag of a 
winning campaign, candidates need to seek additional funding beyond individual contributions.  
In 2010, the winning House campaigns raised an average of more than $560,000 from PAC’s; 
winning Senate campaigns received nearly $2 million.47  Campaign finance rules allow each 
interest group to have a greater monetary impact on a given campaign than may any individual 
who contributes.  An individual is limited to a maximum contribution of $2,500 per election 
cycle, while PAC’s may give $5,000.  Moreover, PAC’s can give to as many campaigns as they 
want and can bundle contributions from individuals, whereas a single person can give no more 
than a total of $46,200 to campaigns.48  Thus, whereas an individual’s influence is limited in 
scope, political action committees can build reputations and donate to coalitions of candidates 
who reflect their views.  Incumbents have a significant advantage in fundraising.  This 
contributes to the extremely high reelection rate for members seeking reelection.  In an average 
year, nine out of every ten incumbents who are running can expect to win their races.  In no 
election between 1998 and 2004 did the House reelection rate dip below 96%.49  Even in the 
“anti-incumbent” 2010 cycle, 85% of House members and 84% of Senators regained their 
seats.50  An important factor behind the advantage of incumbents is their superior fundraising 
                                                 
45
 Ibid.   
Also see: Center for Responsive Politics, “Price of Admission,” 
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/stats.php?cycle=2010, Accessed March 27, 2012. 
46
 Center for Responsive Politics, “Election Stats,” 
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php?cycle=2010, Accessed March 27, 2012.  
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Federal Election Commission, “Contribution Limits: 2011-2012,” 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml, Accessed March 27, 2012. 
49
 Center for Responsive Politics, “Reelection Rates Over the Years,” 
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with PAC’s.  In 2010, most PAC’s gave under 10% of their funds to challengers.51 In total, the 
average House incumbent raised more than five times as much money as did the average 
challenger in 2010; in the Senate, the gap was even wider.52 
PAC’s do not only play an important role in the financing of candidates; they often 
recruit and train the very people who run for office.  Groups such as EMILY’s List on the left 
and the Club for Growth on the right entice potential candidates to run with promises of 
campaign contributions and other forms of support.  In addition, others, such as the AFL-CIO 
and the American Medical Association’s AMPAC, provide favorable polling and strategic advice 
to candidates.53   
Business interests have a large advantage over labor groups when PAC funding is 
analyzed.  In a study after the 2002 elections, Paul Herrnson found that corporate PAC’s 
outspent labor PAC’s by a nearly two-to-one margin, a figure that did not even take into account 
the contributions of trade associations.54 According to The Center for Responsive Politics, in 
2010, business PAC’s outspent labor groups by a margin of about three-to-one.  When soft 
money is analyzed, business groups outspend labor by the whopping margin of seventeen-to-
one.55  These figures are vastly different from the relative financial clout of business groups and 
unions only a few decades ago.  In 1976, the first year of public financing of presidential 
campaigns, unions out-donated business organizations $8 million to $7 million.56  While 
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candidates may not be able to be directly “bought” by soft money, they might be influenced into 
supporting corporate interests in order to avoid negative independent advertising during a 
campaign.  In 2010, the finance/insurance/real estate industries spent the most money of any 
sector, collectively contributing nearly $320 million.57  Therefore, campaign contributions play a 
key role in the incumbency advantage enjoyed by members of Congress.  Business groups, 
particularly the financial services sector, donate much more heavily than labor advocates.   
Campaign Finance and Legislative Influence: 
Campaign contributions play a key role in determining who gets access to members of 
Congress.  Interest groups often donate to members of both parties even if their ideologies are 
not consistent.  For example, in 2010, the finance/insurance/real estate sectors gave 45% of their 
PAC donations to Democrats and 50% to Republicans, even though the latter party is generally 
more supportive of their interests.  Overall, business groups gave 49% to Democrats and 50% to 
Republicans.58  Moreover, PAC’s frequently give money to incumbents who are running 
unopposed in their general elections.  For example, Senator John Thune (R-SD) raised nearly 
$2.5 million from PAC’s between 2005 and 2010, even though he held a safe seat and ultimately 
faced no Democratic opponent.59  In 2009 and 2010 alone (when it was apparent he would run 
unopposed), Thune raised nearly $400,000 from the finance, insurance, and real estate 
industries.60  A big reason for these contributions is that organizations view their financial 
support as a means of buying access to representatives once they are in power.  In 1974, when 
Fred Wertheimer, the executive of Common Cause, was asked about his group’s donation to both 
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liberals and conservatives, he responded:  “the ideology involved is that there is an ideology of 
incumbency…the money is an investment.”61  Former RNC Chairman Bill Brock commented 
that business groups donating heavily to incumbent Democrats reflected an attempt “to buy 
access to Congress.”62  The idea that interest groups view campaign spending as a means to gain 
access is bolstered by the trend among PAC’s to donate most heavily to party leaders and 
committee chairs.  Paul Brewer and Christopher Deering conducted a study on the Republican 
House committee chair battles in 2000, finding that the representatives who donated the most of 
their own money to the Republican Party and Republican candidates nearly always got the 
gavel.63  An implication of this tendency is that money becomes an extremely important 
determinant in who assumes leadership positions; as a result, PAC’s need to contribute in order 
to aid the ascendancy of representatives and ultimately earn access.  
Groups that do not have the resources to form PAC’s run the risk of relative exclusion 
from the political process compared to better-funded business organizations.  Former Senator 
Bob Dole once quipped:  “There aren’t any Poor PAC’s or Food Stamp PAC’s or Nutrition 
PAC’s or Medicare PAC’s.”64  Paul Herrnson has noted that “many groups, such as the poor and 
homeless have no representation in the PAC community…figures on PAC formation and PAC 
spending serve to dispel pluralist notions that all societal interests are equally represented…and 
have a comparable impact on the financing of Congressional elections.”65  As the less 
advantaged do not have the money to gain influence, programs that benefit them may be at 
greater risk of cutbacks.   
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The political science literature has yet to reach a consensus on the degree to which 
campaign contributions affect the legislative process itself.  According to Lee Drutman, existing 
studies have found the statistical impact on legislative outcomes to be minimal.66  Nevertheless, 
it is possible that campaign contributions are still an important distorting factor on Congress.   
David Mayhew cites one such example in Congress.  In the 1960s, Rep. Torbert H. MacDonald 
(D-MA), the Chairman of the House Communications and Power Subcommittee of the Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce Committee, was immobilized from introducing legislation regulating the 
industries under his jurisdiction after electric companies bankrolled his general election 
opponent.  One former aide quipped:  “Even though Torby easily defeated his opponent, the 
experience made him sort of paranoid.  He is now reluctant to do anything that would offend the 
power people.”67  This story illustrates an important limitation within the existing literature:  it is 
possible that business organizations have influenced the political process by scaring members of 
Congress away from attempts to regulate their industries.  Former Representative Millicent 
Fenwick (R-NJ) recounts the impact of contributions on votes:  “members have told me they 
received such-and-such an amount from one of these groups and could not vote with me.”68  In 
one small study, Amitai Etzioni tracked a 1982 House Energy Committee vote to curb auto 
emission standards, finding that members who voted in favor of the legislation received five-
times as much money from auto manufacturer PAC’s as did those representatives voting against 
the measure.69  Although this is an admittedly small-scale study with other possible explanations 
for its results, it does hint at the impact of campaign contributions on the legislative process.   
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Interest group relationships with members may strengthen over time, requiring multiple 
rounds of contributions for desired legislative results.  For example, Thomas Stratmann explored 
the relationship between the financial services industry and Congress in the 1980s and the 
passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley, finding that increases in contributions over time were 
correlated with House members switching their votes from no to yes.70  It is possible that 
members cannot be “bought” for a onetime contribution, but are more receptive to the interests 
of organizations with whom they have an ongoing relationship. Furthermore, in the aftermath of 
the Citizen’s United Supreme Court decision, representatives may be even more scared to push 
legislation that hurts the interests of corporations and the wealthiest citizens.  With the right to 
spend unlimited funds on independent expenditures guaranteed, an era of even more influence 
may be dawning. 
One final consideration in assessing the degree to which campaign contributions 
influence the political process is the nature of the issue being considered by Congress.  Research 
suggests that the more controversial and visible issues tend to be acted upon largely independent 
of campaign contributions, as “well-publicized, contentious issues draw many groups, 
legislators, and committees into the policy process…PAC’s must compete with a variety of 
sources trying to influence legislative voting.”71  On the other hand, in situations in which 
committees legislate on narrow interests and in which there exist long-standing relationships 
between members and industry advocates, PAC contributions tend to have a greater impact on 
voting.  Examples of such behavior include defense contractors and the Armed Services 
Committee, deregulation of the trucking industry, and the exemption of professionals from FTC 
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regulation.72  All this being said, there are still not studies linking PAC contributions as the one 
factor leading to votes.73 
In sum, one of the primary ways that interest groups, especially business organizations, 
attempt to influence the political process is through campaign finance.  Campaigns depend 
significantly on PAC’s to fund their campaigns and provide other support during the electoral 
process.  Over time, campaigns have become increasingly expensive and business groups have 
built a large spending advantage over labor advocates.  While the exact legislative impact of 
campaign finance is still being debated in social science, many contributing organizations view 
such donations as an investment that will generate access to Congress and increased influence in 
the legislative process.  The disproportionate representation of business and other interests 
relative to advocates of the poor and homeless in the political process surely raises about the 
degree of pluralism in the U.S. 
Lobbying 
 The second major way that businesses influence the legislative process is through 
lobbying, defined as “legal activity aiming at changing existing rules or policies or procuring 
individual benefits.”74  As with campaign finance, the available data on government advocacy 
point to a decidedly pro-business slant. 
The Nature and Growth of Lobbying: 
 Norm Ornstein and Shirley Elder cite one veteran political observer commenting on 
pressure politics:  “Lobbying is as old as legislation and pressure groups are as old as politics.”75  
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Lobbying is certainly as old as American government:  in 1783, a group of disgruntled soldiers 
threatened members of the Continental Congress into increasing their pay.  By the 1850s, 
Washington hosted a lively lobbying industry filled with representatives of big business.76  
Throughout the 20th century, the importance of this age-old activity has grown with the size and 
scope of the U.S. government.  While many groups lobby the executive branch and regulatory 
agencies, the largest target of lobbyists is Congress, with its 535 members, various committees, 
and thousands of staffers. 77  Groups seek to gain access to decision makers in an effort to 
“monitor governmental activity that might affect them, initiate governmental action to promote 
their interests, and block action that would work to their detriment.”78  Contact that groups have 
with government officials may be direct (in the form of conversations with legislators or 
testimony before a committee), semi-direct (through communications with legislative staff), or 
indirect (through advertisements or other public statements).  Lobbyists place a high value on 
monitoring public activity, so as to be aware of any potential changes with enough time to affect 
the potential action.   
When trying to initiate a particular policy, high-quality access is an invaluable resource 
for an interest group.  One lobbyist noted:  “I always make sure I have a friend on the 
subcommittee, someone who will look after my interests, who will introduce and push bills or 
amendments for me.  If you don’t have a friend on the inside, then you’re really on the outside 
looking in.”79  Lobbyists can aid legislators by providing information and policy advice, assisting 
with political strategy, providing new policies and proposals, and campaign assistance.  On the 
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other hand, they can sanction lawmakers by asking party leadership to deny a particular member 
a committee slot or leadership role, apply political pressure both in Washington and in the home 
district, negatively endorse a candidate, or aid an opposing candidate.80  Lobbyists constantly try 
to persuade legislators that taking particular actions will be electorally beneficial for them, 
transforming Washington into a “major marketing center.”81 When coupled with strong access to 
decision makers, lobbyists employ strategies designed for maximum influence on the legislative 
process.   
Two authors have written compelling works on interest groups in the legislative process.  
In his book, The Lobbyists: How Influence Peddlers Get Their Way in Washington, Jeffrey 
Birnbaum details his interactions with a group of lobbyists in 1989 and 1990. He describes the 
strategies and motives of these individuals in their dealings with decision makers in Washington, 
arguing that lobbyists are a well-compensated underclass in Washington society, secondary to 
government members and staffs.  Birnbaum illustrates the methods that lobbyists use to achieve 
their ends, ranging from appeals to constituents to express their opinions to their representatives 
to fundraisers and fun-filled “business trips.”82  In his books Demosclerosis and Government’s 
End, Jonathan Rauch builds on the work of Birnbaum, referring to lobbyists and others as 
members of the “parasite economy.”  In these works, Rauch argues that David Stockman, Bill 
Clinton, and Newt Gingrich failed in their quests to reform Washington due to the entrenched 
and powerful nature of interest groups.  He fears that the government will continue to experience 
a precipitous drop in governing ability due to special interests, and describes the logic 
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underpinning the current system.  Both of these books provide excellent insight into the nature of 
lobbying. 
 Since the 1960s, and particularly since the early 1980s, there has been a stunning rise in 
the size and scope of lobbying operations in Washington.  Lee Drutman argues that much of the 
early rise in corporate lobbying had to do with the rash of new regulations in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  Whereas businesses had been content to be “left alone” previously, the threats 
imposed by the government spurred them into action.83  In 1988, four of every ten lobbying 
organizations with Washington offices were founded after 1960.  In 1981, there were 
approximately 7,000 groups listed in the Washington Representatives directory; today, this 
number has increased to more than 14,000.84  Such interest groups include trade associations 
ranging from the AARP and National Association of Homebuilders to the Bow Tie 
Manufacturers Association and the Post Card Manufacturers Association.85  Between 2000 and 
2009, direct lobbying expenses increased from $1.44 billion to $3.47 billion.  When accounting 
for inflation, lobbying expenses have increased an amazing seventeen-fold from the (real) $200 
million in 1983.86  The growth of lobbying activity has outstripped the growth in government:  
between 1998 and 2008, the federal budget grew by 38% and the number of bills introduced 
increased by 43% while lobbying expenditures rose by 77%.87   
Why Groups Lobby and Why the Growth in Washington: 
 There are two schools of thought on the question of why groups lobby.  The first is that 
firms decide to attempt to influence the government as a response to external stimuli.  
Neoclassical scholars such as David Bicknell Truman and Beth Leech have argued that the 
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government’s expansion into new areas spawns trade associations and lobbying operations 
relating to the new regulation.88  They see firms as rational actors who behave predictably based 
on the incentives provided to them by the government and the state of politics.89  In a 2005 
paper, Beth Leech and her co-authors argue that the growth of government over time has led 
interest groups to mobilize around new issues in order to either maintain current programs or to 
oppose them.  They claim that interest groups do not drive the formation of interest group 
ecosystems; this role is more essentially based on the political and policy climate.90  Basically, 
government action serves as a magnet pulling interest groups into the Washington lobbying 
world: “a governmental decision to become involved in an issue area sets the agenda for existing 
and potential organized interests, who are thus encouraged to come to the capital to defend their 
interests and advocate particular solutions to perceived problems.”91 
Another group of scholars believes that lobbying is an activity that firms learn, one that 
builds and reinforces itself over time.  The “Behavioral Theory” of firms posits that 
organizations tend to get in the habit of participating in politics and thus continue their 
involvement.  The “Resource-Based Theory” conveys the idea that firms view political 
engagement as a “strategic asset” that should not be discarded.  Finally, the “Agent-Based View” 
places emphasis on the principal-agent dilemma that results when an organization hires a 
lobbyist.  Because the agent is receiving money for services provided, he or she has the strong 
incentive to persuade the firm to continue its Washington presence.92   
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In his doctoral thesis, Lee Drutman argues that there may be many factors underpinning 
the decision to lobby, but that such a decision tends to be reinforcing and that it leads to 
heightened political activity.  Importantly, Drutman posits that groups often stay in Washington 
with the goal of changing the status quo, rather than reacting to external stimuli.  He analyzes the 
“stickiness” of lobbying, finding that approximately 97% of organizations with lobbying 
activities stay in Washington from year to year.  For those companies that do not have internal 
lobbyists, but use “hired guns,” the rate of renewal is still around 90%.93  Drutman identifies a 
general process by which organizations learn to lobby.  First, the Washington representatives 
pick issues for lobbying that will generate high value to the firm, illustrating the profitability of a 
lobbying operation.  Over time, they look for new issues on which to work and thus the 
organization becomes more entrenched in Washington.94 
A central aspect of the decision to lobby is the perception of the high profits that can be 
gained through government advocacy.  A relatively small change to a large piece of legislation 
can have huge financial effects on particular industries, so targeted lobbying influence can prove 
an excellent investment for firms.  Interest groups rightly see lobbying as a tremendously 
efficient way to improve business.  For example, Matt Miller explores Lockheed Martin’s 
lobbying activities between 1999 and 2006, finding that the company spent $55 million on 
lobbying and received $90 billion in governmental contracts.95  Jeffrey Birnbaum analyzes the 
rate of return on a broader range of issues and estimated the payoff to be closer to 28-1, which is 
still quite a hefty sum.96  Thus, while the issues that bring firms to Washington can vary, 
                                                 
93
 Ibid.,93. 
94
 Ibid., 111-112. 
95
 Matt Miller, “Make 150,000% Today!” Fortune, January 27, 2006.  
Cited in Drutman, 28n. 
96
 Jeffrey Birnbuam, “Clients’ Rewards Keep K Street Lobbyists Thriving,” Washington Post, February 14, 2006.  
Cited in Drutman, 28n. 
Silverman 29 
lobbying tends to be an activity that firms learn to do, and one that the organizations perceive to 
be exceedingly profitable.   
The Bias and Influence of Lobbying: 
 Since the 1960s, political scientists have noted the bias towards business in the makeup 
of interest groups in Washington.  Lee Drutman observes that between 1981 and the present, the 
Washington Representatives directory classifies 34% and 46% of its listings as individual 
companies and 11% to 15% as trade associations.97  Between 1981 and 2006, as the number of 
business listings grew from 7,059 to 12,785, the number of union listings only increased from 
369 to 403.  Over the same time period, the ratio between business groups and “countervailing 
power” (unions and public interest) increased from 11.65 to 15.82.98  When lobbying 
expenditures are analyzed, the gap between business and non-business groups looms even larger.  
A 2001 study by Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech found that in 1996, individual companies 
accounted for 56% of lobbying costs and businesses, trade associations, and professional groups 
comprised 85% of total spending. In contrast, citizen groups and non-profits comprised merely 
10% of total lobbying expenditures. 99   
According to the Center for Responsive Politics, between 1998 and 2010, the top 
industries engaging in lobbying were health, miscellaneous business, and finance/insurance/real 
estate; labor placed twelfth.  In this time period, miscellaneous businesses and the 
finance/insurance/real estate industries each spent nearly ten times as much money on lobbying 
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as did labor organizations.100  Baumgartner and Leech conclude:  “the extent of business 
predominance in the group system is greater than previously reported...Not only do businesses 
constitute the largest category of lobbying organizations in Washington...but they are by far the 
best endowed and most active.”101  Part of this imbalance may be a result of the structural 
difference between corporations and public interest groups.  Corporations that engage in 
lobbying have the advantage of being able to use their general revenues towards political 
advocacy.  In contrast, membership-based public interest groups often have trouble raising the 
necessary funds for a large-scale campaign.102   
More importantly, the disproportionate presence of business groups (both numerically 
and monetarily) has a distorting influence on the legislative process because resources tend to 
translate into outcomes.  In The Lobbyists, Jeffrey Birnbaum concludes that corporations have 
gained significant strength in Washington, becoming “so suffused [in] the culture of the city that 
at times they seem to be part of the government itself.”103  Birnbaum writes that over time, 
corporate interests have transitioned from a “perennial sacrificial lamb” to a “sacred cow” in 
cases of government crackdowns.  Indeed, in the 1990 deficit reduction bill signed into law by 
President Bush, merely 11% of revenue increases came from the corporate tax code, while the 
remaining burden came from individuals.104  Presently, there is simply not much competition 
between corporate and union/public interest lobbyists.  In a survey conducted for his doctoral 
thesis, Lee Drutman interviewed corporate lobbyists and asked them whom they viewed as their 
biggest adversaries.  Not once did they list unions or public interest organizations as their biggest 
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rival.  Indeed, on 37% of the issues, they claimed not to have any challengers.105  Clearly, 
corporations have a significant relative advantage over their union and public interest 
counterparts with regards to lobbying. 
Lobbying is a practice as old as the American government, one that is based on access to 
and a close relationship with members of Congress and their staffs.  Lobbyists have significant 
power with members of Congress in several important areas, including providing information, 
campaigning, messaging, and developing proposals.  The past three decades’ stunning growth of 
firms with a Washington presence is likely due to both the expansion of the federal government 
(the government putting more issues on the table) and the educational process of lobbying 
(organizations learning to utilize advocacy and thus remaining in Washington).  There is a large 
gap between business organizations and unions/public interest groups in the number of groups 
present in the political process and the amount of those groups money spend, and this gap has 
been expanding over time.  The political science literature suggests that such a disparity in 
lobbying presence illustrates an advantage in both absolute and relative terms for corporate 
interests.     
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Part II:  Case Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction and Methodology 
The thesis now turns to a case study analyzing the impact that competing interest groups 
had on two key pieces of financial services legislation between 1999 and 2010.  First, the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 repealed the 1933 Glass-
Steagall Act, removing the barriers between commercial and investment banks and insurance 
companies.  Many people have criticized this legislation, claiming that it enabled firms to 
become “too big to fail,” contributing to the 2008 Financial Crisis.  Indeed, economist and 
columnist Paul Krugman called Senator Phil Gramm the “father of the financial crisis” because 
of this bill.106  Next, this case study explores the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010.  This legislation attempted to fix many of the problems that led to the 
2007-2008 Financial Crisis and to remove causes of systemic risk from the U.S. finance, 
banking, and insurance sectors.  Of particular importance in this last piece of legislation is the 
strength of new regulations that were opposed by corporate and financial interests and supported 
by consumer advocates and unions.  
This thesis draws conclusions about the relative influence of interest groups from several 
sources.  First, the Congressional hearings held during the legislative process are instructive as a 
means to identify the issues about which various interest groups care and about which they 
disagree.  In addition, by observing the different iterations of a given bill prior to and after a set 
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of hearings, one can spot a correlation between changes suggested and changes enacted.  If a 
pattern emerges in which one type of group consistently achieves its desired changes vis-à-vis 
those of its rivals, disproportionate influence is suggested.  In addition, this case study utilizes 
policy papers, press releases, and statements by various interest groups about these pieces of 
legislation.  Finally, the Dodd-Frank section of the case study relies considerably on the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report to explain the causes of the Financial Crisis and 
issues that needed to be reformed.  If these groups were able to block a significant portion of 
these proposals, then excessive influence would be suggested.   
These two pieces of legislation are selected as case studies for several reasons.  First, they 
are important laws attracting significant attention from many interest groups.  As such, the 
possibility of groups failing to take stock of the legislation and mobilize accordingly is low.  In 
addition, Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Dodd-Frank embody intense fights between business 
interests and consumer advocates, allowing one to better gauge the relative influence of both 
types of organizations.  Finally, these cases affect the same industries, yet were passed in two 
decidedly different political climates for business groups.  If financial services and banking 
representatives were able to succeed in 2010, their absolute and relative superiority would be 
strongly suggested. 
A Note on Gauging Influence 
 It is admittedly difficult to establish a causal relationship between legislative outcomes 
and interest group positions.  The external political environment has a considerable impact on the 
ease with which an interest group achieves its policy objectives.  In The Governmental Process, 
David Bicknell Truman notes, “As conditions change... [some] influences become more and 
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others less potent, the fortunes of group claims upon the legislature will rise or decline.”107  For 
example, it could be argued that the era of economic prosperity and rapid stock market growth in 
the mid and late 1990s boosted the chances of legislation favored by the financial services 
industry.  Later, in the wake of the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis, it is possible that the momentum 
for financial reform and large Democratic Congressional majorities were headwinds that banking 
advocates had little chance of overcoming.  A largely pro-consumer and anti-banking piece of 
legislation would not establish the causal relationship that consumer advocates had much more 
influence than financial services groups.  If, however, the financial services industry managed to 
consistently beat back attempts at regulation in 2009 and 2010, one could more reasonably infer 
a causational relationship.  In sum, when attempting to gauge the relative and absolute influence 
of business groups, it is important to consider the external environment in which legislation is 
being drafted.   
 It is also important to consider the numerous counter-factuals and alternate explanations 
for the outcomes of these bills.  It is possible that interest groups had little effect on the direction 
of these pieces of legislation and that the policies enacted were simply those favored by members 
of Congress.  The decision to change a piece of legislation in a more pro-consumer or pro-
business direction may have nothing to do with the efforts of interest groups, but reflect, instead, 
an effort on behalf of party leaders to pick up votes for the proposal.  In addition, one set of 
interest groups might be energized on a particular issue and not face any opposition from other 
organizations.  As a result, one might be able to infer a certain degree of absolute power on 
behalf of the active groups, but no relative power vis-à-vis their competitors.  The effects of 
successful lobbying may be policies that never make it into legislation.  Finally, without detailed 
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information regarding the exact activities of interest groups lobbying against particular measures, 
it is possible that one can miss their successes in preventing the policies’ presence in any forms 
of a particular piece of legislation.  With all these reservations in mind, this thesis will 
nonetheless attempt to gauge the absolute and relative power of interest groups in the legislative 
process. 
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The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 
Introduction and Background 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act repealed much of the 
1933 Banking Act, known as Glass-Steagall.  It removed market barriers to firms acting as a 
combination of a commercial bank, investment bank, and insurance company.  The consideration 
of this bill was triggered by Citicorp’s merger with Travelers Group in 1998.  The firms took 
advantage of previous financial services legislation that granted firms a two-year period 
following a merger or acquisition to divest of offending activities.108  Following announcement 
of the merger, Congress was spurred into action to update financial services law to deal with the 
brewing legal implications of this deal.  It was given the choice of repealing sections of Glass-
Steagall or breaking up what was the nation’s largest financial firm.  
Financial services modernization was not an issue that arose in the late 1990s: the 
banking and insurance industries had been working since the1980s to repeal Glass-Steagall.  In 
1983, President Reagan proposed allowing commercial and investment banks, securities firms, 
and insurance companies to enter each other’s markets, but the proposal gained little traction.  In 
1991, a bill similar to Gramm-Leach-Bliley failed to pass the House.109  Throughout the mid-to-
late 1990s, these industries worked hard to pass banking reform: between 1996 and 2000, the 
number of financial services lobbyists increased from around 150 to just under 250.110 The 
financial services industry placed considerable pressure on Congress to pass financial services 
modernization.  In 1999 alone, the financial service industry spent $187 million on lobbying and 
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donated $202 million to campaigns.111  Ed Yingling, the chief lobbyist for the American Bankers 
Association, called GLB ‘“the most heavily lobbied, most expensive issue’ to come before 
Congress in a generation.”112  According to the New York Times, after the bill was signed into 
law, Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill placed on his wall “a hunk of wood-at least 4 feet wide-etched 
with his portrait and the words ‘The Shatterer of Glass-Steagall.’”113 
Advocates of the legislation argued that it would add efficiency to the financial system:  
people put more money in investment accounts when the economy is doing well and more into 
savings accounts when it is performing poorly.  If commercial and investment banks were not 
separated, people could more easily place money in both savings and investment accounts at the 
same time.  In doing so, firms engaging in investment and commercial banking would perform 
better in both good and bad economic times.   In addition, industry advocates claimed that the 
proposed legislation would help consumers by spurring on the growth of myriad new products by 
firms offering expanded services and competition, giving them the opportunity to have multiple 
needs met by the same institution.  With the development of the Internet and other electronic 
banking services, the past model of regional banks was seen as outdated; financial services law 
should be updated to reflect these changes.114  In addition, the proposed legislation would make 
U.S. institutions more competitive with foreign banks that already offered diverse products.115  
Some advocates of deregulation claimed that larger institutions would pose fewer systemic risks:  
“Bigger would be safer…and more diversified, innovative, efficient, and better able to serve the 
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needs of an expanding economy.”116  At the same time, however, some people worried that ever-
growing institutions would create entities that were “too big to fail,” posing large risks to the 
entire financial system and economy.117   
House and Senate Hearings on the Bill 
 From February 10-12, 1999, the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services 
held hearings about the proposed financial services modernization legislation. A Senate draft bill 
was released in February of 1999, and was followed by hearings in front of the Committee on 
Banking from February 23-25.  During the hearing process for GLB, four broad sets of interests 
developed:  those of large banks and financial institutions, those of smaller banks and businesses, 
those of consumer advocates, and those of the Clinton Administration.  In general, the large 
businesses supported the bill strongly, small banks approved tepidly or opposed it, and consumer 
advocates criticized the legislation for failing to protect individuals.  The Clinton Administration 
accepted the need for financial modernization, but had serious reservations about the lack of 
consumer protections. 
Big Financial Institutions: 
 In general, the banking and securities industries had favorable views towards draft 
versions of GLB.  On February 25, Michael Patterson, the Vice Chairman of JP Morgan and 
Chairman of the Financial Services Council, testified before the Senate Banking Committee.  He 
spoke in strong support of removing barriers between banks and insurance companies, claiming 
that a failure to do so would leave U.S. companies at a disadvantage to their foreign counterparts.  
He claimed that Glass-Steagall represented a different era in finance and was no longer 
applicable, and that banks should be allowed to participate in more commerce.  Overall, 
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Patterson agreed with the general outline for the Senate draft of GLB and offered minor 
suggestions to improve the legislation.118  Robert Gillespie of KeyCorp and the Bankers 
Roundtable and Hjalma Johnson, Chairman and CEO of East Coast Bank Corp the American 
Bankers Association, both spoke in strong support of the Senate draft bill.  Gillespie and Johnson 
both made it a point to mention their support of sections of the bill relating to the treatment of the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The CRA, which was enacted in 1977, sought to curtail 
the practice of “redlining,” whereby banks would draw boundaries around neighborhoods to 
which they extended credit.  Johnson claimed that the CRA hurt banks in relation to their 
competition and burdened them with significant paperwork.  He also argued in favor of allowing 
banks to engage in “a limited basket” of commercial activities, claiming that this would lead to 
community development in some cases.  However, Johnson claimed that such co-mingling 
should only be allowed to occur on a limited basis so as to protect the independence of banking 
and commercial industries.119  One of his major complaints about the bill was its unequal 
regulatory treatment of thrifts and banks.  Johnson urged the Banking Committee to equalize the 
regulations on holding companies of banks and thrifts in order to prevent the flow of capital into 
the industry with less regulation.  On the whole, both of these witnesses spoke in strong support 
of the measures in GLB. 
 Jeff Tassey of the American Financial Services Association and Marc Lackritz of the 
Securities Industry Association also addressed the panel on February 25.  These two 
representatives of the securities industry strongly supported the framework for financial 
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modernization.  However, Lackritz opposed language that would allow banks to engage in 
securities trading, proposing that the banks would instead have to engage in securities trading 
through separate affiliates owned by the larger institutions.  In addition, he urged the committee 
to put all firms that traded securities under the jurisdiction of the SEC, so as to make regulation 
fairer.120  Similarly, speaking before the House Banking Committee earlier that month, Roy 
Zuckerberg of the Securities Industry Association heaped nearly unqualified praise on the House 
version of the bill.121  Therefore, representatives of the banking and securities industries reacted 
very favorably to the draft versions of GLB and tended to advocate for relatively minor tweaks to 
the legislation. 
Small and Community Banks/Independent Insurance Agents: 
Representatives of small and community banks had mixed reactions to the draft versions 
of GLB.  William McQuillan of the Independent Bankers Association of America appeared 
before the House on February 10 before the Senate Committee on February 25.  At the Senate 
hearing, he criticized the legislation for disproportionately favoring large financial institutions, 
creating the possibility of “too big to fail” institutions and endangering the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Fund in the event of the collapse of a financial conglomerate.122  He cited the recent 
collapse of Long Term Capital Management and claimed that GLB would have the effect of 
increasing systemic risk and leading to future bailouts.  In addition, he argued that the recent 
trend of mergers in the banking and financial service industries had anti-competitive effects, 
especially in the credit and debit card markets, to the detriment of small and community 
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banks.123  McQuillan criticized the Senate draft for allowing too much mingling between banks 
and commercial firms, a policy that would “encourage financial institutions to engage in the kind 
of crony capitalism” that had recently undermined the economies of several foreign countries.124  
Finally, he asked the Senate to enforce consumer protection and CRA regulations more 
uniformly across all depository institutions.  McQuillan claimed that community banks were 
much more burdened than less regulated entities such as credit unions.125  In his House 
testimony, McQuillan was more in favor of the legislation proposed, but dedicated a significant 
amount of his testimony to opposing the removal of barriers between banks and commercial 
firms.126   
Scott Sinder of the Independent Insurance Agents of America (IIAA) delivered powerful 
testimony to the Senate on February 25.  He said that while the IIAA had recently come around 
to the idea of financial modernization, it was disappointed with the Senate draft bill and was 
unprepared to support it.  Sinder claimed that the legislation failed to apply equal regulations to 
all issuers of insurance and did not adequately address concerns over consumer protections.  He 
urged the committee to insert language into the bill affirming the rights of states to regulate 
insurance companies.  This would ensure that national entities would not be exempt from 
regulation, as “no comparable regulations exist at the federal level and no federal regulator has 
expertise in this arena.”127  The preemption of state regulations would be dangerous to 
consumers, as it would lead to the loss of state regulatory safety nets that were stronger than that 
of the federal government.  In addition, Sinder argued that states should have the right to 
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discriminate more between banks and non-banks in cases where consumer protections were at 
stake.  Finally, he claimed that consumers would ultimately be harmed if the policies he 
suggested were not inserted into the bill.128  Thus, while representatives of community banks and 
independent insurance agents were amenable to financial modernization, they had significant 
concerns about the Senate and House draft bills.   
Consumer Advocates: 
Consumer advocates were in strong opposition to many of the policies contained within 
the House and Senate draft versions of GLB.  On February 25, advocates from the Consumer 
Federation of America (CFA) and Center for Community Change criticized the Senate draft bill 
for targeting programs that benefited low income Americans, such as provisions in the CRA.  
Mary Griffin of the CFA lampooned the legislation for being weighted in favor of the wealthy 
and financial sector:  “Thus far, we have been disappointed that the balance has been tipped too 
much in favor of industry and regulators' interests, and not the consumer interest…we believe the 
current proposal is a big step backwards for consumers.”129  She urged the committee to 
strengthen protections for consumers purchasing insurance and was dismayed by the lack of any 
protections in the realm of securities. In addition, she worried about the risk of private 
information being shared between entities and supported stronger non-disclosure requirements in 
the law. 130  While Griffin accepted the likelihood of financial modernization, she implored the 
committee to “ensure the market serves the needs of all consumers and does not simply cater to 
the wealthiest.”131 
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F. Barton Harvey, the Chairman and CEO of the Enterprise Foundation, a group 
dedicated to rebuilding neighborhoods and helping people to “take control of their lives and 
communities,” appeared before the Senate Banking Community on February 25.132  He focused 
his testimony on provisions in the draft version affecting the CRA.  Harvey cited the good that 
the CRA did for inner-city neighborhoods and how it also happened to be profitable for banks.  
He wanted the Senate draft’s language insinuating that CRA groups extort banks into lending to 
underserved areas removed.  Finally, Harvey supported the House bill’s precondition that any 
financial institution wishing to engage in new lending activities must have a “satisfactory” or 
better CRA rating, which proved an easy bar to clear, as 97% of banks met that standard.133  In 
his testimony before the committee, John Taylor of the National Community Reinvestment 
Coalition addressed many of the same concerns as F. Barton Harvey, but also expressed his 
worry about the disclosure requirements in the bill.  He claimed that the legislation would lead to 
many new financial products, yet acknowledged that, “worrisome evidence abounds that the 
banking industry is not properly disclosing the risk associated with [existing] non-deposit 
investment products.”134  Taylor advocated clear rules dictating that consumers have the right to 
decide when and under what circumstances their personal information is shared. 
On February 11, George Reider, the Connecticut Commissioner of Insurance and 
Commissioner of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, testified before the 
House Banking and Financial Services Committee.  He criticized the House draft of GLB for 
preempting State Insurance Commissioners’ rights to enforce consumer protections within their 
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jurisdictions.  It would also harm efforts to streamline existing regulations and develop 
uniformity and eliminate redundancy between states, injecting uncertainty into the regulation of 
consumer protections in insurance.  He asked the committee to restore the rights of state 
regulators to ensure consumer protections within their territories.135 The same day, Edmund 
Mierzwinski, the Consumer Program Director of the U.S. Public Interest Research Group, 
appeared before the House Committee.  He implied that the present legislation did not taking into 
account the needs of consumers nearly as much as it attempted to mediate issues between 
regulators and business groups:  “It is critical that the Congress balance this bill, not only 
between the regulators and the special interest, but also in the public interest.”136   
Finally, on February 11, Ralph Nader, appearing as a consumer advocate, lampooned the 
House draft legislation for ignoring the interests of consumers:  “A charitable reading of H.R. 10, 
Mr. Chairman, would be that it is complicated incitement to consumer riot.”137  He criticized the 
bill for failing to strengthen the current regulatory framework and for making the Federal 
Reserve, an institution he characterized as “an indentured big bank agency,” the lead regulator.138  
Finally, Nader worried about the possibility of taxpayer deposit insurance dollars being used to 
bail out a bank that has been brought down by one of its sub-entities, like insurance.  In sum, 
consumer advocates appearing before the Senate and House Banking Committees during 
February of 1999 criticized the draft legislation for failing to protect individual privacy, 
weakening the regulatory framework, hurting the CRA, and catering to the interests of big 
business over consumers.   
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The Clinton Administration: 
The Clinton Administration supported financial modernization, but placed a strong 
emphasis on protecting consumers.  On February 23, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan 
Greenspan spoke in strong support of the GLB framework.  He claimed that if Congress did not 
act, then “developments will undermine the competitiveness and innovative edge of major 
segments of our financial services industry.”139  On February 24, Treasury Secretary Robert 
Rubin addressed the committee.  While he did acknowledge that legislation could streamline the 
natural process of financial modernization, he also claimed that the draft contained “significant 
provisions that are unacceptable to the Administration, and we would oppose the bill in its 
current form.”140  Primarily, Rubin worried about the buildup of systemic risk and economic 
concentration.  In addition, he was concerned about several provisions that would weaken the 
Community Reinvestment Act’s support for lending to low and moderate-income individuals.  
Finally, he worried that the bill did not offer proper disclosure requirements and protections for 
consumers, given the wide range of new financial products that financial modernization 
allowed.141   
Ellen Seidman, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, spoke to the Senate 
Banking Committee on February 24.  She applauded the general idea of financial modernization, 
so long as it ensured the continued safety of the banking system and maintained much of the 
current regulatory structure over savings and loan institutions.  However, Seidman opposed 
portions of the bill that reduced consumer protections and coverage by the CRA, claiming that 
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existing regulations ensure that thrift institutions expand their operations to previously 
underserved communities:  “the CRA stimulates insured depository institutions to pursue 
creative and profitable financing endeavors they might not have otherwise explored.”142   
In his testimony to the Senate Banking Committee, Securities and Exchange Commission 
Chairman Arthur Levitt opposed the wide gaps in securities regulation left by the draft version of 
the GLB Act.  In particular, he was concerned about leaving banking exemptions to securities 
law, even as banks would be allowed to engage in investment banking activities, leaving a 
“dangerously bifurcated system of regulation.”143  The SEC believed that a financial system with 
such a loophole intact would undermine the rights of investors and impede the SEC in its mission 
to “safeguard the integrity, fairness, transparency, and liquidity of U.S. securities markets.”144  
He claimed that loss of fairness and transparency in the market would hurt both investors and the 
economy.   Similarly, on February 12, Harvey Goldschmid, the General Counsel of the SEC, 
argued before the House Banking Committee that the House version of the legislation would 
provide very different forms of investor protection at securities firms and banks, a situation of 
which the individual may not even be aware.  He described this problem of legislation in no 
uncertain terms:  “At best, the state of affairs is inconsistent.  At worst, which may very well be 
the case, it is dangerous.”145  In sum, members of the Clinton Administration supported the idea 
of financial services modernization, but had strong misgivings about the nature of early House 
and Senate drafts of the legislation. 
 
                                                 
142
 Ellen Seidman, “Prepared Testimony of Ellen Seidman, Director of the Office of Thrift Supervsion,” Senate 
Housing, Banking, and Urban Affairs Committee, February 24, 1999.  Available through Proquest Congressional. 
143
 Arthur Levitt, “Prepared Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,” 
Senate Housing, Banking, and Urban Affairs Committee, February 24, 1999.  Available through Proquest 
Congressional. 
144
 Ibid. 
145
 Harvey Goldschmid, “Prepared Testimony of Harvey Goldschmid, General Counsel of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission,” House Banking and Financial Services Committee, February 12, 1999. 
Silverman 47 
The Senate Version 
On May 6, 1999, the Senate passed S. 900, the upper chamber’s version of financial 
modernization, by the margin of 54-44. 146  Of the 54 Senators voting in favor of the bill, 53 were 
Republicans; the 44 voting against it were all Democrats.  The Senate bill differed from the final 
GLB legislation in two important ways.  First, it contained no sections covering consumer 
protections.  While other versions of the legislation would address the issue of the rights of 
individuals to not have their private information disclosed, S. 900 did not touch the subject.147  In 
addition, the Senate bill attempted to roll back the CRA.  In Section 303, the legislation 
considered any bank that had been rated “satisfactory” in its previous CRA inspection to be so 
until its next examination, making it difficult for consumer complaints to overturn such ratings.  
The CRS describes this part of the legislation as placing “the burden of proving the substantial 
verifiable nature of information alleging CRA noncompliance upon the party filing such 
information,” rather than upon the accused bank.  In addition, S. 900 granted a huge exemption 
from the CRA to community banks, waving the regulation for any bank not located in a 
metropolitan area and not exceeding $100 million in assets.148  
The Senate version of GLB took a decidedly pro-bank and anti-consumer stance.  This 
legislation barely reflected the views of consumer advocates that came before the panel.  By 
failing to contain a consumer protection section and placing the burden of proof on individuals in 
reporting CRA violations, this bill clearly favored business interests.  Interestingly, the Senate’s 
exemption of small banks from the CRA illustrates the influence of those small banks in the 
legislative process, relieving that industry of a potentially large cost.  The Senate’s near party-
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line vote (with the more pro-consumer Democratic Party voting against) provides significant 
evidence to support the hypothesis that S.900 demonstrates a strong relative advantage of 
banking interests over consumer advocates. 
House Version 
On July 1, 1999, H.R. 10 passed the House by the wide margin of 343-86.  The House 
bill was decidedly more consumer-friendly than the Senate one.  Section 110 was meant to 
ensure that the CRA was fulfilling its mission:  this clause required a report from the Treasury 
Secretary analyzing whether the CRA was succeeding in providing credit to low and middle 
income Americans, as well as to small businesses and farms.149   In addition, the entirely of Title 
V in the bill was dedicated to consumer protection and privacy rights.150  Apart from the bill’s 
treatment of consumers and the CRA, H.R. 10 was quite similar to S. 900 and the final version of 
GLB.   
Ironically, a Victoria’s Secret catalog had a significant influence on the addition of 
consumer privacy protections in the House version of the GLB Act.  During markups of the bill 
in the Commerce Committee, Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) introduced an Amendment providing 
privacy protections to consumers, called “Title V.”  Conservative Republican Rep. Joe Barton 
(R-TX) provided crucial support for this amendment, relating the story of his own experience of 
having his personal information sold to firms.  Barton’s credit union sold his address to 
Victoria’s Secret, which began sending catalogs to his Washington house.  He worried that his 
wife would find the magazines and think he was buying lingerie for other women.  According to 
a later statement by consumer advocate Ed Mierzwinski, banking industry lobbyists were caught 
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off guard by Barton’s support and were unable to react in time to stall the amendment’s 
passage.151 
One important proposal that was not accepted in the House version of GLB was a clause 
allowing bank holding companies to merge with commercial institutions.  For example, if such 
inter-mingling was allowed, Citigroup might try to merge with Wal-Mart or G.E.  While many 
lobbyists from the financial services industry advocated this policy and while the bipartisan 
Congressional leadership, the Treasury, and some people in the Federal Reserve agreed, Rep. 
Jim Leach (R-IA) succeeded in preventing its inclusion in any legislation.152  He feared that the 
removal of barriers between commercial enterprises and bank holding companies would produce 
incentives to control commercial firms, rather than lend to families and entrepreneurs.  As a 
result, “the mission of banking would have been transformed from stimulating innovation and 
entrepreneurship to precipitating asset conglomeration,” concentrating wealth in the hands of 
very few people.153  Interestingly, Leach argued against this provision by asserting to the banking 
industry that there was a good chance that their parent firms would be bought by commercial 
enterprises, rather than the other way around.154  The defeat of this provision represents the limits 
of the absolute power of the banking industry in influencing the legislative process:  even when 
the banking industry had the support of party leadership and parts of the Administration, its 
initiatives were still thwarted largely by one member of Congress.  Therefore, H.R. 10 was a 
much more consumer-friendly bill than the Senate version, a characteristic which is likely 
reflected in its overwhelmingly strong margin of passage and bipartisan support. 
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Final Legislation 
Following passages of H.R. 10, the House and Senate were unable to come to terms on a 
joint version of the bill.  When a conference committee was established at the end of July, its 
members were instructed to craft a pro-consumer compromise:  “Consumers enjoy the benefits 
of comprehensive financial modernization legislation that provides robust competition and equal 
and non-discriminatory access to financial services and economic opportunities in their 
communities”155 Following tense negotiations between the Clinton Administration and Senate 
Republicans, Gramm-Leach-Bliley passed the House and Senate on November 4, 1999 by the 
wide margins of 90-8 in the Senate and 362-57 in the House.156   
Title I in the bill repealed elements of Glass-Steagall and the Bank Holdings Act that 
prohibited banks from engaging in financial services activities and insurance.  On the issue of 
insurance regulation, the bill partially preempted state laws that “impede or restrict” insurance 
issuance from insured depositary institutions and enumerated the state regulations that are 
permitted.157  Still, Section 111 explicitly gave the regulatory jurisdiction of insurance 
subsidiaries of banks to the state governments.  Section 108 of Title I addressed concerns about 
“too big to fail,” ordering a study and report to Congress about the possibilities for too big to fail 
institutions and ways to minimize systemic risk.158  Subtitle C of Title II gave certain investment 
bank holding companies the option of picking the SEC as their lead regulator, while also giving 
them the right to voluntarily withdraw from such supervision.159 The legislation instructed the 
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Federal Reserve to observe companies with both insurance and banking subsidiaries, keeping an 
eye on the sharing of business operations information. 
The final version of GLB changed the way institutions were regulated, giving the 
financial services industry greater leeway.  For example, banks regulated by the Federal Reserve 
could own securities affiliates regulated by the SEC that were required to hold significantly less 
collateral.  In addition, securities firms were allowed to own thrifts and industrial loan 
companies, entities with accessed to FDIC-insured deposits and free of regulation by the Fed.160  
Investment banks quickly took advantage of this rule:  between 1999 and 2007, Merrill Lynch 
expanded its industrial loan company from less than $1 billion to $4 billion.  Similarly, Lehman 
Brothers increased its thrift from $88 million in 1998 to $24 billion in 2005.161  Such measures 
were not contested by any major interest groups, even though the deregulation posed the danger 
of building systemic risk.  Thus, the deregulation of financial institution supervision 
demonstrates the absolute power of business interests in gaining favorable measures from 
Congress.   
GLB and Consumer Rights: 
The GLB Act created some questions about privacy and consumer rights.  If different 
types of banking firms engaged in insurance activities, there would be greater risk of the 
unwanted use of personal information.  As such, the amount of information sharing allowed and 
the disclosure of companies’ privacy policies was an important issue for consumer advocates. 
The negotiation of these consumer privacy rights was an important sticking point in the 
legislation, particularly for Democrats, the resolution of which helped to ensure its ultimate 
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bipartisan passage.  The final bill contained three important rules--the Financial Privacy Rule, 
the Safeguards Rule, and pretexting provisions--that sought to mitigate these privacy concerns.   
GLB contained relatively significant explicit consumer protections.  Section 305 of the 
bill directed federal banking agencies to issue regulations prohibiting insurance companies from 
conditioning the extension of consumer credit on purchasing other products, requiring the 
physical separation of banking and insurance activities, and outlawing discrimination against 
victims of domestic violence.  In addition, Section 305 mandated that federal banking regulators 
establish an expedited mechanism for consumers to lodge complaints and allege violations of the 
bill.162  Section 324 required the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers to 
create an office for consumer complaints.   
The entirely of Title V was devoted to privacy and the appropriate use of consumer 
information, and its language was virtually identical to the Title V language in H.R. 10.  The act 
clearly stated that it is the duty of financial institutions to protect consumers:  “Each financial 
institution has an affirmative, continuing obligation to respect the privacy and to protect the 
confidentiality of customer nonpublic personal information.”163  The GLB Act required firms to 
provide an account of their privacy policies to customers, defined as individuals who are 
engaged in continuous relationships with the financial institutions.  Such statements had to 
include the details of “what information the company collects about its consumers and 
customers, with whom it shares the information, and how it protects or safeguards the 
information.”164   
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In contrast, consumers were defined as individuals who have used a product of service 
from a particular financial institution.  The distinction between customers and consumers is 
important because consumers were not entitled to a privacy notice unless the firm would be 
sharing his or her information with non-affiliated firms.165  In addition, customers and consumers 
had the right to opt out of information sharing, and firms’ privacy statements must clearly state 
the means by which they may do so.  Such opt-out rights were not limited to outside firms, but 
also included the affiliates of the financial institution.166  Title V gave enforcement power to the 
FTC, banking, and securities agencies and required the FTC and Attorney General to report 
annually to Congress on the status of these consumer protections.167  The opt-out provisions are 
important because they allow customers and consumers to avoid having their personal 
information shared with other firms (like insurance companies) that could ultimately prove 
detrimental to their interests.  
Finally, Subtitle B of Title VII reflected a compromise between the Clinton 
Administration and Senator Gramm on the Community Reinvestment Act.  In late October of 
1999, the bill was in danger of being killed over disputes between the Administration and 
Gramm about the nature of the CRA.  Gramm wanted to exempt thousands of smaller banks 
from the regulation, claiming that it placed a huge burden on them; meanwhile, the White House 
wanted to outlaw the right of banks with an unsatisfactory CRA lending record to expand into 
new businesses.  In the end, Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Chuck Schumer (D-NY) managed to forge a 
compromise between the two sides, allowing the bill to move forward.168  Section 712 set up a 
schedule for small bank exemptions to CRA exams, provided they had met standards for 
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community lending. The large margin of passage reflects pro-consumer measures such as 
expanded individual privacy rights and a protected CRA.169  
Despite the importance of Title V to consumers, there are several business-friendly 
aspects of the privacy rules in GLB.  First, the onus of deciding whether to opt out of information 
sharing falls on consumers, rather than the burden to request and receive permission to 
disseminate such data falling on financial institutions.  When companies provide the opt-out 
wavers to consumers, they may be difficult to decipher and filled jargon.  As a result, people who 
do not want their personal information to be shared may be unable to understand how to prevent 
firms from sharing it.  Despite these concerns, according to John Tatom, the privacy protections 
in GLB have proven to be effective in preventing the wide dissemination of personal information 
across subsidiaries of larger institutions.  Interestingly, Citigroup provided significant leadership 
in crafting privacy restrictions contained within GLB.170   
Conclusions and Reflections 
The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 represents the culmination of years of 
lobbying on behalf of the banking, financial services, and insurance sectors to overturn Glass-
Steagall.  On the whole, interest groups representing big business appear to have been quite 
successful in getting Congress to pass legislation in accordance with their preferences.  However, 
business influence was not hegemonic vis-à-vis consumer advocates.  Representatives of 
consumers were successful in attaining privacy requirements in resisting attempts to undermine 
the CRA.  It is probable that, when these provisions were changed or added, more pro-consumer 
representatives and Senators switched their votes in favor of the bill, allowing the final 
legislation to pass by such a wide margin.   
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It should be noted that, since it possessed the power to veto unfavorable legislation, the 
Clinton Administration had significant power as an advocate for groups other than the financial 
services sector.  In late October of 1999, financial modernization legislation was nearly dead, as 
the Administration threatened to veto anything that did not protect consumers and maintain the 
CRA.  Given the split between the more pro-consumer House legislation and very pro-business 
Senate bill, it is difficult to assess the exact degree to which consumer advocates influenced this 
legislation.  In particular, three main counter-factual questions emerge.  First, what would the 
fate of Title V have been had Rep. Joe Barton not strongly supported it?  In addition, how would 
consumer protections and the CRA have been affected if the Clinton Administration were not so 
active in their favor?  Finally, when pressure mounted, did banking and financial services interest 
groups cave on issues of lesser importance to them (consumer protection and the CRA) in order 
to gain passage of the rest of GLB (a strong interest)?   
This case fits well into the current literature that emphasizes the strong advantage that 
business groups have throughout the legislative process, but also demonstrates the durability of 
consumer advocacy.  Thus, while the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act did reward the financial services 
industry for years of lobbying, consumer advocates were ultimately able (with the help of the 
Clinton Administration) to influence lawmakers on some key issues.  
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The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
 
Introduction and Background 
 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was signed into law 
by President Obama on July 21, 2010.171  It represented the largest single overhaul of banking 
and financial services regulation since Glass-Steagall was passed in 1933.  Dodd-Frank was 
largely a response to the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis.  In June of 2009, President Obama called 
for a “new foundation” to the financial system through legislation that would be a “sweeping 
overhaul of the financial regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since the 
reforms that followed the Great Depression.”172  The bill, which spanned nearly 1000 pages, was 
broken up into sixteen titles, required regulatory agencies to write 243 rules, and called for 67 
one-time studies and 22 new periodicals.173  Dodd-Frank coincided with a rash of spending and 
campaign contributions by business interest groups.  According to 2010 numbers from the Center 
for Responsive Politics, the finance/insurance/real estate sectors spent more than $475 million in 
lobbying expenditures and gave nearly $63 million to Congressional candidates through PAC’s 
from 2008-2010.174   
 
 
                                                 
171
 “Bill Summary and Status, 111th Congress, H.R. 4173 (As of 7/21/2010), CRS Summary” Congressional 
Research Service, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR04173:@@@L&summ2=m&#major%20actions, Accessed March 27, 2012. 
172
 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory Reform,” June 17, 2009, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/, Accessed March 
27, 2012. 
173
 Congress, House & Senate, 111th Congress, 2nd Session,  H.R. 4173, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf.  Accessed March 27, 2012. 
Also see Davis Polk & Wardwell, “Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Enacted into Law on July 21, 2010,” July 21, 2010, http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-
413b-b870-b7c025ed2ecf/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-
f786fb90464a/070910_Financial_Reform_Summary.pdf, Accessed March 27, 2012. 
174
 Center for Responsive Politics, “Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate,” 
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.php?cycle=2010&txt=F01, Accessed March 27, 2012. 
Silverman 57 
Causes of the Financial Crisis: 
 In 2007 and 2008, the U.S. economy was hit with the largest financial meltdown since the 
Great Depression.  During the crisis, two of the country’s largest investment banks--Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers--either filed for bankruptcy or were sold for a fraction of their recent 
worth.  In addition, Congress passed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to stabilize the 
financial system and keep the economic downturn from spiraling out of control.  In 2011, the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Board submitted an illuminating report on the causes of the crisis.  The 
report concluded that the calamity was avoidable and that there had been strong warning signs of 
the crisis that went either ignored or discounted.175   
The people responsible for the crisis included banks, securities firms, mortgage 
originators, government regulators, credit rating agencies, and consumers.  On Wall Street, the 
constant pursuit of risk and increased leverage fueled the Financial Crisis.  Firms continually 
sought new ways to reduce the amount of collateral they were required to own, thus giving them 
an opportunity to earn higher profits.  Banks sought risky loans on which they could earn high 
rates of return and sell to risk-seeking investors.  At Merrill Lynch, CEO Stan O’Neil pushed the 
firm to take on more risk, hiring “aggressive young turks while getting rid of those who didn’t 
have the risk appetite he was looking for.”176  Such actions led to the mortgage machine, through 
which Wall Street firms needed to fill a seemingly insatiable appetite for investments with higher 
yields.  This mentality created a system that was in serious danger of creating a financial crisis.   
The inflation of the mortgage bubble was greatly aided by poor and predatory mortgage 
origination, led by originating companies that competed for market share and sought to sell off 
their mortgages to Wall Street banks as quickly possible.  In 2003, approximately 8% of 
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originated loans were “subprime,” lent to borrowers without ideal credit. By 2005, this number 
had more than doubled to 20% and was still rising. 177  Most subprime loans were not classic 30-
year fixed interest rate mortgages, but hybrid, adjustable-rate mortgages with a low teaser rates.  
For example, a 2/28 loan would have a low set rate for the first two years and then would reset to 
a higher, adjustable interest rate during the third year.178  In some cases, people were sold 80/20 
piggyback loans, in which the homebuyer would take out two loans:  one for the mortgage and 
one for the down payment.179  Possibly the most dangerous type of subprime loan was the “Pay 
Option ARM.”  These products let consumers choose whatever interest rate they wanted from 
the start, beginning at a teaser rate so low that it did not even cover the accumulation of interest.  
Once the money owed by the consumer increased to a certain level, a trigger would kick in, 
forcing the borrower to suddenly begin paying the full interest rate.180  Compounding the risk of 
the existence such mortgages on a large scale was their sheer profitability:  Pay Option ARM’s 
were five-times more profitable for mortgage originators than a prime fixed-rate loan.181  
Between 2003 and 2006, the market volume of such loans increased from $65 billion to $255 
billion.182 The continuation of the system was built on the proposition that the housing market 
would continue to go up indefinitely; in order to prevent defaulting on loans, subprime borrowers 
would frequently refinance and receive new teaser rates.  If the housing market either crested or 
fell, borrowers would be unable to refinance and default rates would skyrocket.   
In order to meet the constant Wall Street demand for loans, originators had to drop 
lending standards.  One solution was to decrease the amount of documentation required to 
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receive a loan.  Between 2000 and 2007, the percentage of all loans that were low-and no-doc 
increased from 2% to 9%.  In 2006, 80% of nonprime Alt-A loans had limited or no 
documentation.183  The mortgage origination market was fraught with examples of fraud and 
predatory lending.  In many cases, employees of originators would falsify documents to approve 
customers for loans that they would never be able to repay. In All the Devils Are Here, Joe 
Nocera and Bethany McLean tell stories of loan originators forging signatures and entire 
documents in order to get loans approved. One former Ameriquest loan officer named Lisa 
Taylor alleged in court documents that management “cordoned, encouraged, and participated in 
extensive document alteration, manipulation, and forging in order to sell more loans.”184 Without 
the actions of subprime mortgage originators, the housing bubble would not have been able to 
grow nearly as large as it did. 
 The credit rating agencies--Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch--were faced with 
perverse business incentives and consistently overrated mortgage-backed securities right up to 
the start of the crisis.  These agencies were essential to the operation of the mortgage 
securitization process:  they rated tranches of mortgage-backed securities and other derivatives, 
and provided information critical for banks in determining how much collateral to hold.185  
Unfortunately, their business model created large and destructive conflicts of interest.  The 
ratings agencies were paid for every deal they rated.  In addition, the existence of three 
institutions allowed Wall Street firms to “shop ratings,” playing them against each other and 
creating incentives to give favorable ratings.186  After Moody’s went public in 2000, its drive for 
market share increased and it began to care less about issuing accurate ratings than it did about 
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gaining business.187  Adding to the problem, the share of Moody’s revenue contributed by 
structured financial products (of which mortgage backed securities were a part) more than 
quadrupled between 2000 and 2007.  According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, the credit 
agencies’ financial risk models for mortgage-backed securities were based on faulty assumptions 
and failed to take into account negative trends in loan underwriting standards.188  As a result, the 
credit ratings agencies rated thousands of mortgage-backed securities as being much less risky 
than they actually were, thereby subjecting the entire financial system to unknown risks.   
One of the largest factors underlying the eventual size and severity of the Financial Crisis 
was the influence of credit derivatives, especially collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s), 
synthetic collateralized debt obligations (synthetic CDO’s), and credit default swaps (CDS’s).  A 
CDO is a bundle of tranches (sections, rated by risk-level) of other securities that is repackaged 
in its own security.  Prior to the Financial Crisis, investment banks were having a difficult time 
selling the riskier tranches of mortgage-backed securities, so they “created the investor” for 
them.189  Because of faulty ratings models (and often a lack of will to be more accurate), the 
ratings agencies classified 80% of these CDO’s as AAA, as safe as U.S. Treasury bonds.190  
Then, the banks were able to sell these new securities relatively easily.  Adding to the risk were 
credit default swaps.  Essentially, a credit default swap is an insurance policy on a security or 
securities:  the buyer pays a fee to the insurer, but is covered in the event of any losses in the 
underlying security.  CDS’s were the vehicle that nearly brought down AIG:  the firm’s financial 
services practice ultimately insured $533 billion of securities by 2007.191   
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However, what turned the proverbial “keg of dynamite” into a “nuclear bomb” was the 
addition of the synthetic CDO.192  Synthetic CDO’s are collections of CDS’s referencing existing 
CDO’s.  They contained no asset-backed tranches and essentially served no purpose other than to 
bet on the performance of the underlying securities.  As such, every synthetic was a zero-sum 
game:  one party went long and one went short; one made money and one lost it.193  Synthetic 
CDO’s allowed the replication of risky securities many times over:  there was no limit to the 
number of side-bets that could be made on other securities, so long as there were people willing 
to take both sides of the wager.  For example, one tranche in a CDO called Glacier Funding CDO 
2006 4-A had the original worth of $15 million, but was referenced in $85 million of synthetic 
CDO’s.194  Tranches used by Goldman Sachs in these derivatives were replicated as many as 9 
times.195  Thus, CDO’s, CDS’s, and synthetic CDO’s were powerful contributors to the buildup 
of risk in the financial system. 
The financial crisis was also a profound and spectacular failure of government policy.  In 
the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration had an internal debate regarding the proper way to 
regulate derivatives.  Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) proposed regulating Over the Counter derivatives as futures under the authority of 
CFTC, but was ultimately rebuffed by others in the Administration. The Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 solidified the deregulation of derivatives, banning CFTC from 
claiming oversight authority.196  The power to regulate derivatives would have been extremely 
important to the government’s having a better idea of the buildup of risk from mortgage-backed 
derivatives.  The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report blames the Treasury, Fed, and other agencies 
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for failing to realize that risk was being concentrated in the financial system, rather than 
diversified.  In addition, it claims that the federal regulators’ response amounted to “programs to 
put fingers in the dike.”  It continues to argue that such regulars had no unified plan to contain 
the crisis, leading to confused and inconsistent actions.197  Therefore, the Financial Crisis was 
largely caused and exacerbated by the excessive pursuit of risk and leverage, poor and predatory 
lending standards, credit derivatives, and ineffective government action.  Dodd-Frank sought to 
correct these and other problems. 
Committee Hearings 
 Between the fall of 2008 and the final passage of Dodd-Frank in the summer of 2010, the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and Committee on Agriculture and 
House Committee on Oversight and Regulation, Committee on Financial Services, Committee 
on Energy and Commerce, and Committee on Agriculture held dozens of hearings on the 
financial crisis and policies being considered for regulatory reform.  A few broad trends have 
presented themselves throughout these panels.    
Banking Industry Advocates: 
 Representatives of the banking industry opposed many of the new proposed regulations 
that were being considered for financial regulatory reform.  This sentiment is embodied in a 
November, 2009 quote by Ed Yingling, the President of the American Bankers Association, to 
the Washington Post: “To some degree, it looks like they're just blowing up everything for the 
sake of change…If this were to happen, the regulatory system would be in chaos for years. You 
have to look at the real-world impact of this.”198 
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On September 30, 2009, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing on 
proposed consumer protection reform.  Michael Menzies of the Eastern Community Bank and 
Trust and the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) was concerned that the 
CFPB would harm small and community banks, while leaving large institutions both “too big to 
fail” and “too big to regulate.”199  He claimed that since the CFPB was not concerned with the 
safety and soundness of community banks, it would tend to release rules that would ‘‘promulgate 
unnecessarily burdensome or contrary rules to those issued by the prudential regulator.’’200  
Instead, the ICBA requested that the CFPB be given separate guidelines in dealing with smaller 
entities.  Finally, Ed Yingling of the American Bankers Association testified before the House 
Financial Services Committee.  While he commended the panel for adding more nuance to 
consumer protection rules, he also asked it to consider the interests of community banks, “the 
great majority of which had nothing to do with causing the financial crisis, which are struggling 
with a growing mountain of regulatory burdens.”201  Yingling claimed that the CFPB was given 
powers well beyond what were needed to correct the wrongs of the Financial Crisis.  In 
particular, he criticized the use of “vague terms” in establishing guidelines for the agency, 
arguing that they will lead to “uncertainty” in credit markets, causing a reduction in credit 
extension.202   
On February 4, 2010, E. Gerald Corrigan, a Managing Director at Goldman Sachs, 
appeared before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee.  He opposed 
several aspects of the Volcker rule then being proposed by President Obama and considered by 
the Senate.  First, he argued that the proposal would lead to difficult questions about what 
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constitutes proprietary trading and what is normal “market making by banks.”  In addition, 
Corrigan claimed that the risks associated with the ownership of hedge funds and private equity 
firms could be “effectively managed and limited by means short of outright prohibition.”203  He 
argued that such subsidiaries are essential in creating best practices in new markets, such as 
energy, and would too bluntly deal with the conflicts of interest associated with modern 
finance.204   
The same day, Barry Zubrow of JP Morgan Chase resisted the Volcker Rule.  He flatly 
claimed that, “the activities the Administration proposes to restrict did not cause the financial 
crisis,” and in many cases actually helped financial firms to diversify risk and weather the 
economic storm.205  He argued that the current regulatory framework was a sound basis for 
controlling proprietary trading risk and that the new regulatory regime should be expanded to 
non-deposit holding institutions that are connected with the financial system.206  Zubrow also 
strongly criticized the Administration’s proposal to limit the size of financial firms, claiming that 
the concentration of institutions had little to do with worsening the crisis and noting that the U.S. 
is less concentrated than other highly developed countries.207  In sum, representatives of the 
banking industry recognized the need for additional consumer protection, but opposed significant 
parts of the CFPB and Volcker Rule. 
Financial Services Industry Advocates: 
Representatives of financial services were generally complementary when discussing 
potential proposals for Dodd-Frank.  At a July 2009 hearing in front of the House Finance 
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Committee, representatives of the banking and securities industries expressed their opinions on 
President Obama’s proposed reform legislation.  Richard Baker, the CEO of the Managed Funds 
Association, a trade association for hedge funds, began his testimony by emphasizing the small 
role that hedge funds played in the Financial Crisis.208  While he agreed to the proposal to require 
hedge funds to register with the SEC and the creation of clearinghouses for Over the Counter 
(OTC) derivatives, he emphasized the need to allow hedge funds to enter into customized 
derivatives contracts.  Randolph Snook, the Executive Vice President of the Securities Industry 
Financial Markets Association supported many of the policies designed to prevent the buildup of 
systemic risk, including the creation of a Financial Services Oversight Council, and the 
clearinghouses to regulate OTC derivatives.209  Douglas Lowenstein, the President and CEO of 
the Private Equity Council, was largely complementary of the Obama proposal.  He supported 
many new forms of regulation, but sought an exemption for private equity firms from certain 
regulations to prevent systemic risk.210  These witnesses viewed additional regulation as a means 
to improve market transparency and efficiency. 
On October 7, 2009, the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing specifically 
on limiting risk in the OTC derivatives market.  Scott Sleyster, representing the American 
Council of Life Insurers, supported federal regulation of the OTC derivatives market, especially 
through a central clearing house for trades.  While he had some concerns that certain insurance 
products would be misconstrued to apply to derivative regulation, Sleyster was pleased with the 
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proposals in the Dodd-Frank draft.211  Like other representatives of the financial services 
industry, James Hill of Morgan Stanley and the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association spoke highly of the House draft legislation to increase “oversight of the derivatives 
markets and the activities of individual market participants.”212  He had relatively minor 
concerns with the legislation, mainly concerning the treatment of different types of swaps and 
the desire for more authority by the SEC and CFTC.213  Finally, Stuart Kaswell, the General 
Counsel for the Managed Funds Association, a trade group for hedge funds, addressed the 
committee.  Citing the need to prevent another catastrophe like the one that befell AIG and 
Lehman Brothers, Kaswell applauded the committee’s work to push sound regulatory reform 
legislation.  In particular, he praised clearinghouses for OTC derivatives and further regulation of 
counterparty risk.214   
On December 2, 2009, the Senate Agriculture Committee held a hearing about proposed 
legislation to reform regulation of the financial derivatives market.  Blythe Masters of JP Morgan 
Chase supported the general idea of having OTC derivatives pass through central clearing 
houses, but cautioned the Senators that not all OTC market participants would be capable of 
going through such institutions and that not all derivatives could be regulated on such exchanges.  
She advised the committee to focus more on reducing counterparty exposure to risk than on 
simply clearing as many deals as possible.215  In addition, Masters supported requiring markets to 
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incorporate more information sharing and the guaranteed right of regulators to attain “any 
information at any time and in any form.”   
Finally, on September 30, 2009, Bill Himpler of the American Financial Services 
Association (AFSA) addressed the House Financial Services Committee on consumer protection 
policies in the proposed regulatory reform bill.  Himpler supported the idea of greater consumer 
protection, but had serious reservations about the nature of the House proposal.  First, he 
questioned the CFPB’s approach to regulation, claiming that it would “try to fix what is still 
working and use a one-size-fits-all approach…to financial service products.”216  For example, 
trying to compare terms on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage to a loan for a washing machine would 
be both inflexible and unhelpful.  Himpler claimed that the CFPB would lead to a reduction of 
credit available to consumers and that the increased regulatory costs associated with the 
regulation would be passed on to consumers as a sort of ‘‘tax.’’217  He argued that the CFPB 
would ultimately not serve the needs of consumers and that these people would be better served 
in an improved version of the current regulatory framework.  In sum, members of the financial 
services industry were largely supportive of House and Senate financial regulatory reform 
proposals for derivatives reform; they were less in favor of existing consumer protection reform 
plans.   
Consumer Advocates: 
 Consumer advocates saw financial regulatory reform as an opportunity for important 
legislation guaranteeing the rights of consumers to be passed.  In particular, they supported the 
creation of a consumer financial protection bureau, new regulations to prevent predatory lending, 
and whistleblower protections.  On September 30, 2009, the House Finance Committee held a 
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hearing specifically on the proposed Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  Hilary Shelton of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) supported the 
creation of the CFPB as a means to help end the targeting of minorities, the elderly, and others 
by “unscrupulous lenders” and the underserving of these people by traditional financial firms.218  
Shelton blamed inconsistencies in the current set of rules and lax enforcement standards for the 
“financial stagnation, and, in too many cases, the economic ruin of people’s lives, families, and 
entire communities.”219  She believed that the CFPB would help to prevent many of the abuses 
that led to the Financial Crisis and that it would ease the lives of many people who struggle to 
deal with financial institutions.  Shelton did request that the regulation of the CRA be placed 
under the CFPB and that requirements in the CRA be strengthened and expanded.220 
 Similarly, Michael Calhoun of the Center for Responsible Lending supported the creation 
of the CFPB, claiming that, had it existed, it would have prevented many of the worst abuses 
prior to the Financial Crisis.221  He blasted federal preemption of state laws aimed to prevent 
consumers from being exploited and beseeched Congress not to preempt stronger state laws 
when implementing the CFPB.  Instead, Calhoun proposed that the CFPB exist in addition to 
state consumer protection laws, allowing localities to “detect problems and test solutions.”222  
Janis Bowdler of the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) emphasized the importance of new 
consumer protections for minorities:  “Subprime creditors frequently targeted minority 
communities as fertile ground for expansion.”223  She cited a HUD study from 2000, finding that 
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low-income black individuals were three times more likely to receive subprime loans than were 
white people of similar incomes.224  Bowdler commended the proposal for the CPFB, 
particularly the Office for Fair and Equal Opportunity and the draft bill’s refusal to preempt 
stronger state laws.  She proposed eliminating loopholes for credit unions, real estate brokers, 
and auto-lenders and supported bringing the CRA under CPFB jurisdiction.225  Finally, Anna 
Burger of the Service Employees International Union testified in favor of consumer protections 
in the House draft bill.  In particular, Burger commended the presence of whistleblower 
protections-- measures that would provide bank employees with a voice in calling attention to 
harmful and deceptive practices--in the legislation.226  Thus, consumer advocates strongly 
supported measures in Dodd-Frank aimed at protecting consumers and preventing deceptive and 
abusive practices. 
Discrepancies in House and Senate Forms of Financial Regulatory Reform Legislation 
 In June of 2009, President Obama released a report detailing his goals for financial 
regulatory reform.227  His outline provided an important blueprint for both the House and Senate 
versions of Dodd-Frank.  Indeed, as he prepared to sign the final legislation, President Obama 
remarked that the final agreement “represents 90 percent of what I proposed when I took up this 
fight.”228  Financial regulatory reform legislation was introduced into the House on December 2, 
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2009.229  It passed on December 11 by the margin of 223-202.  No Republicans supported the 
bill and 27 Democrats voted against it.230   
 Following the passage of H.R. 4173 from the House, the Senate received the legislative 
baton on financial regulatory reform.  On May 20, 2010, the Senate Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs Committee and the entire Senate passed the upper chamber’s version of H.R. 
4173.  The bill passed by the margin of 59-39, with 56 Democrats in favor and 2 Democrats 
voting against.  On the Republican side, Senators Brown (R-MA), Snowe (R-ME), and Collins 
(R-ME) supported the legislation; Senators Feingod (D-WI) and Cantwell (D-WA) opposed it.231  
Much of the legislation is similar to the House and conference reports, though there are some 
major differences. 
The Senate legislation, unlike the House version, contained a prohibition on proprietary 
trading by any insured depositary institution or entity that controls an insured depositary 
institution, known as “The Volcker Rule.”232  The existence of this policy in the Senate bill is a 
reflection of President Obama’s endorsement of a proprietary trading ban on January 21, after 
the passage of the House legislation.233  Unlike the Volcker Rule in the final Dodd-Frank, the 
Senate’s legislation included an outright ban on investment banks “sponsoring or investing in 
hedge funds or private equity funds,” rather than the partial ban in the final legislation.234  
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Senators Merkley (D-OR) and Carl Levin (D-MI) drafted an even stronger version of the 
Volcker Rule and were building a coalition of Senators to support it as an amendment to the bill.  
However, Republican senators invoked the “unanimous consent” rule, by which all members 
would have to agree to bring an amendment to the floor for a vote.  After this failure, Merkley 
and Levin managed to attach their amendment to an unrelated one by Senator Sam Brownback 
(R-KS) that exempted auto-dealers from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  However, 
just before the measure came to the floor for a vote, Senator Brownback withdrew his 
amendment, killing Merkley-Levin simultaneously.235 
 Like the House and final bills, the Senate established clearinghouses through which 
derivatives had to be cleared.  Unlike both the House and conference reports, however, the upper 
chamber banned banks from derivatives trading.  It voted down an amendment to ban the use of 
naked CDS’s (buying a CDS without also owning the underlying CDO).236  Like the other two 
bills, the Senate established the CFPB, but did so in a manner more consistent with the final 
legislation.  Like the conference report, this legislation created the CFPB as a stand-alone body, 
independent of the Fed.  It also had broader regulatory authority, including over auto-loans, a 
provision that was ultimately removed in the conference committee.237  In sections relating to 
predatory lending, unlike the Senate and final bills, the House version did not require mortgage 
originators to verify that consumers have a “reasonable ability to repay” their loans.238   
On the issue of “too big to fail,” the House, Senate, and final bills were largely consistent.  
One notable amendment that would have placed a limit on the size of financial institutions failed 
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in the Senate.239  Investor protections were also slightly different in the Senate form of the bill, 
excluding provisions requiring banks to retain a certain percentage of simple products like 
mortgages and inserting language mandating that investment brokers act in the interest of their 
clients.240  The Senate bill also contained the “Durbin Amendment,” named after Illinois 
Democratic Senator Richard Durbin.  This policy was not included in the House bill, but was 
maintained in final legislation.  The Durbin Amendment gave the Federal Reserve the power to 
regulate the fees that credit and debit card issuers charge consumers, requiring that such 
transaction fees be “reasonable and proportional to the actual cost incurred by the issuer or 
payment card network with respect to the transaction.”241  Finally, Title XI of the House bill was 
much more limited in scope than the final bill, not including major restructuring of the Federal 
Reserve and failing to create a new Vice Chairman position.242  In sum, despite containing some 
different provisions and rules, the House and Senate bills are largely similar, tending to favor 
strong regulatory power and consumer interests over the interests of financial services firms. 
Conference Committee and The Final Bill 
 On June 9, 2010, the House rejected the Senate version of financial regulatory reform and 
appointed members to a conference committee.243  The Senate version of financial regulatory 
reform served as the model for much of the conference committee’s work.244  By June 29, the 
conference issued a unified version of Dodd-Frank; it was passed in the House on June 30 by the 
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margin of 327-192 and in the Senate on July 15 by the vote of 60-39.245  In the House, three 
Republicans voted in favor of the bill and 19 Democrats voted against it; otherwise, this was a 
partisan roll call (Democrats voting in favor).  On the Senate side, 59 Democrats and Scott 
Brown (R-MA) voted for Dodd-Frank and 39 Republicans opposed it.246   
 Title I of the bill focused on maintaining financial stability and preventing the buildup of 
systemic risk.  This section created two offices within the Treasury Department:  the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Office of Financial Research.  The Financial 
Stability Oversight Council is headed by the Treasury Secretary and consists of the heads of 
various regulator agencies, including the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), and the SEC.  This body was required to meet at least four times a year and 
was instructed to “identify risks to U.S. financial stability…promote market discipline, by 
eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties of such 
companies that the Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure, [and] 
respond to emerging threats to the stability of the financial system.”247  The FSOC was given the 
power to bring domestic and foreign non-bank financial companies under supervision and 
require them to register with the Fed.  In addition, it had the authority to collect information from 
any state or federal financial regulatory agency and may require any bank or non-bank financial 
institution with assets in excess of $50 billion to submit reports on its financial condition, risk 
management practices, and transactions.  Moreover, it had the power to take actions to mitigate 
risk among such large institutions, including ordering them to terminate activities, restrict the 
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sale or use of financial products, or order them to move assets to an unaffiliated entity.248  The 
Office of Financial Research was tasked with supporting the FSOC and subpoena power over 
any financial institution.249  Other important rules in Title I include subjecting non-bank financial 
companies supervised by the Fed to the same enforcement procedures in the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act to which banks are subjected, giving the Fed the power to order stress tests, and 
requiring large institutions to minimize credit exposures to the failure of one institution to 25% 
of the company’s stock.250 
 Title II detailed the process by which financial entities may be liquidated in an orderly 
fashion.  Dodd-Frank allowed the FDIC and Securities Investor Protection Corporation to 
liquidate insurance companies and non-bank financial institutions if they meet the legal standards 
for such action, subject to appeal by a bank’s board to federal district court.251  This section of 
the legislation was meant to minimize the possibility of future bailouts of financial institutions.  
Title III abolished the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), splitting the agency’s duties and 
power among other regulators.  In particular, the OCC received the power to regulate federal 
savings associations and was given chief rule-making power over these organizations.  The 
legislation provided the Fed with significant power in the interim between the abolition of the 
OTC and when the OCC would assume control.  Finally, Dodd-Frank replaced the OTC 
Director’s place on the FDIC board with the head of the new Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau.252 
 Title IV, also known as the “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 
2010,” introduced significant regulation over hedge funds.  The act required hedge funds to keep 
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certain records, including the amount of assets under management, leverage, and counterparty 
exposure and to provide these records to the SEC if the agency makes a reasonable request for 
them.253  Interestingly, these regulations of hedge funds came even as most observers agreed that 
such financial institutions had little to do with causing the financial crisis.254  Title V, containing 
the “Federal Insurance Office Act of 2010,” created the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within 
the Treasury.  This office was ordered to “monitor the insurance industry, identify issues or gaps 
in the regulation of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry or 
the U.S. financial system, [and] monitor the extent to which traditionally underserved 
communities and consumers, minorities, and low- and moderate-income persons have access to 
affordable insurance products.”255  The FIO was given subpoena power and the authority to 
enforce regulations.  This portion of Dodd-Frank is explicitly pro-consumer in its emphasis on 
the rights and interests of underserved communities. 
 Title VI is also known as the "Bank and Savings Association Holding Company and 
Depository Institution Regulatory Improvements Act of 2010.”  It contained the important and 
controversial measure known as the Volcker Rule.  Named for former Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Paul Volcker, the Volcker rule banned banking entities from engaging in proprietary 
trading and from owning more than 3% of any hedge fund or private equity firm.256  
Additionally, Section 621 contained a conflict of interest provision banning banks from engaging 
in any deal that would produce a conflict of interest with their clients.  The 3% allowance was 
weaker than the original Senate version of the policy, which issued a blanket ban.  This policy 
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was designed, in part, to prevent some of the conflicts of interest that had developed in the lead-
up to the Financial Crisis. In many cases, investment banks secretly took the short side of deals 
on which their clients went long.  In the famous Abacus Deals, Goldman Sachs packaged risky 
mortgage-backed securities into synthetic CDO’s and sold them to investors while it took the 
short side of the deal.  When many of these securities became worthless in the wake of rising 
foreclosures, Goldman reaped billions in profits while its investors lost considerable sums.257  
The legislation ordered the CFTC and SEC to develop the exact regulatory framework that will 
be used to enforce the Volcker Rule.258  This regulation is quite controversial, as it greatly 
curtails a significant stream of revenue for investment banks.  However, the degree to which 
financial services interests are able to influence the result of this legislation will become clearer 
when the SEC and CFTC fill in the remaining gaps in the bill. 
 Title VII of Dodd-Frank, the “Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010,” 
concerned itself with the regulation of financial derivatives.259  This is an extremely important 
portion of the bill, as it overturned much of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, 
expanding the regulatory power of the CFTC and SEC vis-à-vis the securities industry.260  
Section 712 granted regulatory oversight responsibility for swaps to the CFTC and for security-
based swaps to the SEC.  Derivatives that are a mixture between these two types of swaps were 
regulated by both agencies.261  This portion of Dodd-Frank also contained language explicitly 
banning the use of taxpayer funds to bail out swaps institutions that need funds as a result of their 
derivative trading activities.262  Section 748 contained the consumer-friendly provisions of a 
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CFTC Consumer Protection Fund to reward whistleblowers and finance education programs so 
that consumers can spot violations of securities law.263  Section 763 created “a clearing agency to 
submit and the SEC to review each security-based swap…to determine whether it should be 
required to be cleared.”264 For the first time, “Over the Counter” (OTC) swaps would be cleared 
through exchanges.   Importantly, many of the rules in this section were not enumerated in the 
act and were left to the discretion of relevant agencies, providing business groups with an 
opportunity to bend the regulatory regime to their wills.265   
 Title VIII of the bill, called the “Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 
2010,” sought to reduce the likelihood of systemic risk by ordering the Fed to prescribe risk 
management standards and giving it the power to request risk information from member 
companies.266  Title IX, the “Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010,” created 
the Investor Advisory Committee within the SEC to advise the agency on, among other things, 
“initiatives to protect investor interest [and] initiatives to promote investor confidence and the 
integrity of the securities marketplace.”267  Section 922 authorized the creation of a 
whistleblower bounty program, by which any person who provides original information that 
leads to a successful SEC enforcement resulting in sanctions of $1 million or more is entitled to 
between 10% and 30% of sanctions collected.268  Subtitle C concerned itself with the regulation 
of the credit ratings agencies, increasing regulation of nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations (NRSRO’s) via the newly created Office of Credit Ratings in the SEC.269 Subtitle 
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D augmented regulation of asset-backed securities, requiring mortgage securitizers to hold a 
minimum percentage of the security on its books, among other requirements.270   
 Title X, also known as the “Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010,” was one of the 
highest-profile portions of Dodd-Frank.  This portion of the legislation created the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, housed within the Federal Reserve System.  Section 1021 assigned 
the bureau the following mission:  to “implement and enforce federal consumer financial law to 
ensure that all consumers have access to fair, transparent, and competitive markets for consumer 
financial products and services.”271  The bureau was supposed to watch for risks to consumers 
posed by financial products or services.  Under Subtitle C, the CFPB was provided the authority 
to ban “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in connection with any transaction with a 
consumer for, or the offering of, a consumer financial product or service; and (2) promulgate 
regulations to prevent such practices.”272  In addition, it was tasked with ensuring that 
consumers are provided proper disclosure about the nature and risks associated with financial 
products and services.  Finally, Subtitle E granted the CFPB the enforcement powers to 
investigate, adjudicate, and litigate potential offenders.273 
 Title XI concerned the Federal Reserve System and amended the Federal Reserve Act.  
Section 1102 granted the Comptroller General the authority to audit the Fed and Section 1108 
created a second Vice Chairman position.274  Title XII attempts to expand access to the financial 
system by encouraging people of low and moderate incomes to participate in mainstream 
finance.  It established programs for these individuals to open accounts at FDIC insured 
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depositary institutions and provided funding for financial literacy programs.275  Section XIII, the 
“Pay it Back Act of 2010,” related to TARP.  This portion of the legislation reduced the amount 
of money the Treasury is allowed to spend on troubled assets by more than $200 billion and 
required biannual reports from the Treasury Secretary to Congress on the status of TARP.276 
 Title XIV, the “Mortgage Reform and Ant-Predatory Lending Act,” is one of the most 
important consumer protection sections in Dodd-Frank.  Four of the subtitles--A, B, C, and E--
serve as “enumerated consumer law” to be administered by the CFPB.277  Section 1403 banned 
all forms of compensation for mortgage originators that vary based on any terms other than the 
amount of principal.  In addition, it prohibited a mortgage originator from predatory lending 
practices such as steering a consumer to purchase a loan he or she is not reasonably able to 
repay; steering a qualified consumer into an unqualified loan; administering variable lending 
practices among consumers with equal credit that are based on age, race, ethnicity, or gender; 
and mischaracterizing a consumer’s credit history to qualify for a loan.278  These measures were 
intended to end many of the predatory lending practices that grew and perpetuated the housing 
bubble and therein led to spikes in foreclosures.  Subtitle B established minimum lending 
standards for issuing mortgages.  Moreover, Section 1413 allowed consumers facing foreclosure 
to use as a defense the fact that the mortgage creditor either steered the consumer into bad loan 
terms or did not conduct due diligence on his or her ability to repay.279 Title XIV also established 
tougher regulations for high-cost mortgages and created an office of Housing Counseling.  
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Finally, Subtitle F established more stringent guidelines for the appraisal process, requiring 
multiple physical visits for high-risk mortgages.280 
Conclusion and Considerations 
 Dodd-Frank demonstrates significant consumer protection and additional regulation on 
the banking, insurance, and financial services industries.  At face value, this legislation seems to 
be pro-consumer and largely impervious to business interest group positions.  Policies such as 
the creation of the Federal Insurance Office and Titles IX, X, XII, and XIV were significant pro-
consumer measures.  Dodd-Frank contains numerous new rules, regulatory responsibilities, and 
sources of agency authority.  The fact that the bill remained strong in regulating business 
throughout the legislative process hints at less than absolute influence by financial interest 
groups.  Indeed, some important rules, such as the Volcker Rule, were actually added later in the 
process. 
However, the legislation is not nearly as “anti-business” as it might appear.  Business 
groups were quite successful in ensuring that the task of writing of many of the rules was given 
to regulatory agencies.  This gives interest groups the opportunity to lobby for favorable 
regulations while outside of the public eye.  Even when regulations are fully recorded, they will 
only be as strong as the wills of the regulators.  Indeed, “it was often said in the aftermath of the 
crisis that agencies like the Fed and the SEC and the OCC had plenty of tools to curb the abuses 
that were taking place in the banking system.  They just lacked the will.”281  History will 
ultimately record whether these Dodd-Frank regulations have a real effect on preventing future 
financial crises.  In addition, banking advocates succeeded in weakening the Volcker rule in the 
conference report, garnering banks the right to have a limited stake in hedge funds and private 
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equity firms.  Banking advocates also succeeded in defeating an Administration proposal to limit 
the size of financial firms.  Finally, one must consider the fact that business groups supported 
certain pro-consumer parts of the legislation.  For example, the financial services industry 
backed derivatives clearinghouses and further investor protections.  Provisions that may appear 
to be pro-consumer at the expense of business might well be supported by industry advocates. 
When assessing the relative degrees of influence within the legislative process between 
business groups and consumer advocates, it is important to consider both the makeup of 
Congress and the larger political trends.  In the wake of the Financial Crisis, regulatory reform 
was almost inevitable, putting financial services advocates at a disadvantage and consumer 
advocates in better position.  After the near collapse of the financial system, business groups had 
less clout, both in the media and among members of Congress.  In addition, the strong 
Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress made life more difficult for industry 
advocates, as many of these members were more pre-disposed to the interests of consumer 
advocates and potentially hostile to the financial sector.  Democrats tend to be more amenable to 
the interests of consumers than they are to those of big business, so odds were further stacked 
against financial services industry lobbyists.   
Finally, it is important to consider the impact of the Obama Administration in the shaping 
of Dodd-Frank.  The President’s early draft had a powerful effect in influencing the overall 
structure of this legislation, making significant changes more challenging for industry groups to 
secure.  With the Administration’s stance often very clear (and the President’s power to veto), 
writers of the bills were likely more cautious in making sweeping alterations.  Also, when it is 
considered as a consumer advocate group, the Obama Administration greatly amplified the 
relative power of consumer groups in relation to businesses.  In sum, Dodd-Frank is largely 
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inconclusive on the relative power of interest groups.  Given the very anti-Wall Street climate, 
large Democratic majorities, and a Democratic President, odds were stacked against corporate 
interest groups.  Once all of the unwritten rules are enumerated, it will be easier to assess the 
relative and absolute power of business groups and consumer advocates with regards to Dodd-
Frank.   
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Conclusion 
Through case studies of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Dodd-Frank Acts, this thesis has 
sought to determine the extent to which corporate interests influence the lawmaking process in 
absolute and relative terms vis-à-vis their adversaries.  The dominant view in social science 
research is that business organizations have the upper hand in legislative influence.  They deftly 
utilize the tools of campaign finance and lobbying to achieve their policy goals.  The case studies 
of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and Dodd-Frank demonstrate mixed findings with regards to the 
influence of business groups and consumer advocates.  On the one hand, Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
represented the culmination of more than a decade of lobbying pressure by the banking and 
financial services industries.  However, the bill established robust consumer privacy standards 
and maintained the CRA.  Meanwhile, Dodd-Frank appears on the surface to be very pro-
consumer at the expense of business.  However, many unwritten rules may ultimately favor the 
banking and financial services industries.  In addition, business groups were often in support of 
certain regulations in the bill, stances that yield little information about their relative and 
absolute influence.  Finally, business groups succeeded in weakening the Volcker rule and 
several other proposed policies prior to the passage of the final bill. 
In general, it is clear that business interest groups have significant legislative influence in 
both an absolute and a relative sense. When considering these cases, one gets the sense that, 
while Madison’s view of American interest group politics is not dead, neither is it thriving. Still, 
business organizations do not have hegemonic control over the legislative process.  Consumer 
advocates, especially when backed with a Democratic presidential administration, clearly have 
the strength to achieve their policy ends.  In general, this thesis shows the importance of 
considering the external political environment in which a bill is written:  the relative and absolute 
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strength of interest groups is highly dependent on the environment, as seen in the case of Dodd-
Frank.  Therefore, the case studies in this thesis demonstrate the high absolute and relative 
strength of business interest groups, subject to constraints by the external political environment.   
Suggestions for Further Research 
Going forward, more research could be conducted on financial services legislation, 
particularly to determine the effect of the partisan composition of Congress and the Presidency. 
Case studies should be conducted on bills passed under a Republican president and both 
Democratic and Republican Congresses.  In addition, a study could be conducted comparing 
members’ voting habits over time in relation to varying amounts of PAC money or lobbying time 
they receive from business and consumer/public interest groups.  Research could analyze the 
relative and absolute power of business organizations and consumer advocates in interactions 
with the federal bureaucracy.  Future studies could incorporate more interviews with 
policymakers and lobbyists in order to better understand the decision processes behind the 
policies incorporated in bills.  Finally, there should be research on specific issue areas on which 
business and consumer advocates, respectively, have clear and opposing viewpoints. Such 
legislation includes recent bills relating to credit cards, bankruptcy, and mortgage origination. 
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